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NO EXIT: THE PROBLEM OF SAME-SEX
DIVORCE*
ELISABETH OPPENHEIMER**
Same-sex divorce is one of the most complicated and least
discussed aspects of the gay rights movement. The legal
complexity is best illustrated with an example. Suppose a same-
sex couple marries in Massachusetts, which recognizes gay
marriage, then moves to Pennsylvania, which does not. The
relationship ends. Where can the couple divorce? The surprising
answer is nowhere. Pennsylvania courts will not divorce them
because Pennsylvania does not recognize their same-sex
marriage. Massachusetts courts will not divorce them because
Massachusetts-like every other state-only grants divorces to
current residents, even though it will marry non-residents. As
same-sex couples are beginning to disco ver, the problem is not
hypothetical. There are people desperate to end their marriages
who are unable to do so, and there are same-sex couples
unwilling to get married in the firstplace because divorce may be
unavailable.
This Article explains the state laws that create this problem and
why there are no obvious solutions. The Article then surveys the
state court decisions on same-sex divorce. In light of this
jurisprudence, the Article examines the limited scholarship on
howjudges should treat divorce petitions from same-sex couples.
The Article concludes that judges can often grant those divorce
petitions, but that they must pay more attention to the state laws
regulating same-sex unions than current scholarship suggests.
Although legislative solutions to the same-sex divorce problem
have been almost completely ignored, this Article argues that
legislatures are in the best position to solve the problem.
Specifically, this Article suggests that states that recognize same-
sex marriage should allow any same-sex couple married in the
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state to divorce there, whether or not the members of the couple
reside in the state at the time of the divorce. This Article further
argues that Williams v. North Carolina does not bar this simple
solution, as other writers have assumed. The Article ends by
summarizing the mostpractical solutions to the same-sex divorce
problem for judges, legislators, and same-sex couples.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the first things family lawyers tell excited gay couples
planning to marry may come as a surprise: maybe they should
reconsider.1 While gay couples can now marry in several states, they
are often unaware that they may not be able to divorce in any state.
1. Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2003, § 9 (Style), at 2 ("Meanwhile, some legal experts are cautioning couples outside
Vermont to think twice about traveling to obtain a civil union. 'Unless you are a resident
of Vermont, or plan to be a resident of Vermont, it is unwise to register for a civil
union'...."); Nathan Koppel, Same-Sex Couples Face Another Growing Hurdle-Divorce,
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2008, at A12 (noting that a lawyer urged gay couples considering
marriage "to run in the other direction"); Tara Siegel Bernard, For Gay Couples,
"Traditional" Divorce Isn't Always an Option, BUCKS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2009, 5:10
PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/for-gay-couples-traditional-divorce-isnt-
always-an-option/ (quoting a family lawyer who theorized she would be "hesitant" to
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A simple example illustrates the same-sex divorce problem:
suppose two women from Massachusetts marry there, then move to
Pennsylvania a few years later. The relationship ends and they decide
to divorce. Where do they go to get a divorce? They can't go to
Massachusetts, which-like every other state-requires that at least
one member of the couple live in the state for a significant period of
time (there, one year) immediately before filing for divorce.2 This is
true regardless of whether the couple was married in Massachusetts,
whether the spouses were Massachusetts residents at the time of the
marriage, and whether both spouses agree to the divorce. On top of
that, Massachusetts will not grant a divorce to anyone who has
"removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce."3 But the couple can't get divorced in Pennsylvania, either. If
they try, the judge will likely tell them that they are not married
under Pennsylvania law, so there is no union to dissolve.' The couple
might assume they could divorce in Nevada, which has a reputation as
a "divorce mill." But Nevada actually has a six-week residency
requirement for divorce, and in any event it does not allow same-sex
divorce because it doesn't recognize same-sex marriage.'
marry in a state that recognized same-sex marriage if she lived outside the state); see also
Melissa Meinzer, Same-Sex Couples in St. Louis Can Get Married in Iowa. They Just Can't
Ever GetDivorced., RIVERFRONT TIMES (St. Louis), Dec. 2, 2010, http://www
.riverfronttimes.com/2010-12-02/news/same-sex-divorce-st-louis-missouri/ ("When asked
what out-of-state same-sex married couples should do if they want a divorce, [the
attorney] laughs ruefully. 'Drown themselves in the Mississippi!' ").
2. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5 (LexisNexis 2003); Colleen McNichols Ramais,
Note, 'Til Death Do You Part... And This Time We Mean It: Denial ofAccess to Divorce
for Same-Sex Couples, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2010) (citing I HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 703 (2d ed. 1987)
(discussing residency requirements)).
3. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce is founded on
domicile. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
Residence is only a proxy for proving domicile, and if the party intends to leave
immediately after obtaining the divorce, there is no valid domicile. See also Williamson v.
Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914) ("The essential fact that raises a change of abode to a
change of domicil[e] is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere.").
4. In fact, a scenario much like this one happened in March 2010. See Kern v. Taney,
11 Pa. D. & C.Sth 558, 559 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. P1. 2010). Two women were married in
Massachusetts in 2009. Id. at 559. The court's decision does not make clear whether they
were residents of Pennsylvania at that time or whether they later moved to Pennsylvania.
See id. at 559-60. By October 2009, they were living in Pennsylvania and sought a divorce
there. Id. at 559. The court found that it could not recognize the underlying marriage and
thus denied the divorce. Id. at 563. The court noted that "[a]pparently, the parties are not
permitted to obtain a divorce in Massachusetts for failure to qualify under the residency
requirements, although the parties were permitted to be married there." Id. at 560 n.2.
5. NEV. CONST. art 1, § 21 ("Only a marriage between a male and female person
shall be recognized and given effect in this state."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020(e) (1985)
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All of this means that some gay couples find themselves in the
unique situation of being married without any way to divorce. The
problem is not hypothetical. A couple much like the one described
above had a divorce denied last year in Pennsylvania.6 Some couples
are so desperate to obtain a divorce that they uproot their lives to
move to a state that recognizes gay marriage in order to divorce;7 one
woman is considering having a sex-change operation so that she can
divorce as a member of a heterosexual couple.8
In the context of opposite-sex divorce, the Supreme Court has
recognized that divorce is the only way that couples can "mutually
liberate themselves from the constraints ... that go with marriage."9
Divorce is so critical to individual autonomy that even proponents of
"covenant" marriage-a type of marriage some states offer to
heterosexual couples that theoretically cannot be dissolved via no-
fault divorce-acknowledge that covenant marriages are likely
unenforceable in court.' ° Yet gay marriages can turn into super-
covenant marriages that cannot be dissolved in a no-fault divorce or
for any other reason, including abuse, adultery, or medical
catastrophes.
Moreover, the unavailability of same-sex divorce may harm
same-sex marriage. Mobile same-sex couples who understand the
divorce problem may choose not to marry as long as their marriage is
(establishing a residency requirement). The only true domestic divorce mill is Guam,
which will grant an uncontested divorce if one of the parties has resided in Guam for seven
days. See 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 8318(b) (2011) ("If both parties consent in writing to a
divorce or dissolution of their marriage, a divorce or dissolution may be granted if one of
the parties has resided in Guam for at least seven (7) days immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint."). Guam does not marry same-sex couples. See Brandon Miller,
Freedom to Marry Goes to Guam, CHANGE.ORG (Dec. 30, 2010), http://news.change.org
/stories/freedom-to-marry-goes-to-guam. See generally 19 GUAM CODE ANN. ch. 3 (2011)
(including all statutes governing the "contract of marriage"). However, Guam does not
ban recognition of same-sex marriages contracted in other states. Id. § 3107 ("All
marriages contracted outside of the territory of Guam, which would be valid by the laws of
the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in the territory of Guam."). Thus
far, it appears that no same-sex couple has tried to obtain a divorce in Guam, but it might
be possible to do so.
6. SeeKern, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th at 558.
7. Divorce Hard to Get for Some Gay Couples, USA TODAY (Apr. 15, 2008, 7:25
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-15-gay-divorces_N .htm.
8. Eve Conant, The Right to Love--and Loss, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2010, 8:00
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/20 0/04/13/the-right-to-love-and-loss.html.
9. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,376 (1971).
10. See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-The Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93,106 & nn.68-69 (2003).
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unequal to heterosexual marriage in this critical way. I That is exactly
why their lawyers warn them about the issue. 2 One state law, now
repealed, specifically provided that couples who were unaware of the
divorce problem had to be informed of it when they applied for a civil
union license (presumably creating some uncomfortable moments for
couples already at the town hall). 3 Marriage equality necessarily
includes equal access to divorce, but access to divorce is almost totally
ignored in gay rights campaigns.
The problem of same-sex divorce also provides a new way of
thinking about the argument that marriage regulation should always
be left to the states. To some extent, state-by-state regulation of
same-sex marriage has been a triumph of federalism and the notion
that states are the "laboratories of democracy."' 4 Gay marriage has so
far been legalized in only a few states, and decisionmakers in other
states have been able to wait to see the effects of legalizing gay
marriage before making a decision on the issue. 5 But, as the divorce
cases show, state-by-state regulation of something as fundamental as
marriage can have unintended, complicated consequences. This is
particularly true in a society that is highly, and increasingly,
geographically mobile. 6 Seen in this light, arguments that gay rights
11. Unfortunately, there are no surveys or studies documenting the extent of this
problem, and data that is not anecdotal is hard to come by. The fact that lawyers warn
their clients about the issue, however, suggests that it is something that engaged same-sex
couples take into consideration.
12. See supra note I and accompanying text.
13. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160(f) (repealed 2009) ("A town clerk shall provide a
person who applies for a civil union license with information prepared by the secretary of
state that advises such person of the benefits, protections and responsibilities of a civil
union and that Vermont residency may be required for dissolution of a civil union in
Vermont.").
14. Jonathan Rauch, A More Perfect Union: How the Founding Fathers Would Have
Handled Gay Marriage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2004, at 88; see also New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of
the benefits of federalism is that one state may serve as a laboratory for new ideas).
15. See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, National
Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices
/SameSexMarriage/tabid/l6430/Default.aspx (last updated July 14, 2011) (listing the states
that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Rauch, supra note 14, at 88 (noting that
legislators may look to other states to see the effects of legalizing gay marriage).
16. See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2155 (2005) (noting that
automobiles and airplanes have increased societal mobility); J. Thomas Oldham, What If
the Beckhams Move to L.A. and Divorce? Marital Property Rights of Mobile Spouses
When TheyDivorcein the United States, 42 FAM. L.Q. 263, 263 & n.1 (2008) (citing census
statistics on the number of married and separated couples that move each year); John R.
Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61
MICH. L. REV. 823, 824 (1963) (citing statistics to show that "[g]eographic mobility has
20111
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organizations should push for uniform recognition of same-sex
marriage under the federal Constitution,17 or that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause should be interpreted more broadly and enforced more
stringently, 8 look more compelling.
The problem of same-sex divorce is just beginning to receive
attention in the popular press. At this point, however, it has been
addressed by only a few academics, and only limited aspects of the
problem have been discussed. 9  This Article will present a
comprehensive overview of the problem and will synthesize the
existing literature for the first time. Part I explains the importance of
divorce. Part II reviews the most significant same-sex divorce cases
and the various theories on which judges are basing their opinions.
Scholars have thus far spent relatively little time analyzing the gay
divorce jurisprudence that already exists, but if academics are to give
advice to judges, it is useful to know what theories judges are finding
sensible now. Part II then reviews the extant scholarship in light of
that jurisprudence and concludes that the scholarship offers a
valuable starting point for analyzing same-sex divorce cases, but does
not sufficiently account for the patchwork of state laws regulating
marriage, divorce, and same-sex unions. Part III considers whether
intensified at a comparatively steady rate in every decade since 1900"); Adam Weiss,
Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-Sex Couples in the United States
and the European Union, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81, 82 (2007) (noting LGBT
people move frequently because of different laws and societal norms relating to
homosexuality in different states and countries); Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual
Visitation: The New Wave of Communication Between Children and Non-Custodial Parents
in Relocation Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 567, 567 & nn.3-11 (2003) (noting, among
other statistics, that one in five Americans changes residence each year); Michael M.
O 'Hear, Note, "Some of the Most Embarrassing Questions".- Extraterritorial Divorces and
the Problem of Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 104 YALE L.J. 1507, 1512 & n.28 (1995)
(discussing impact of the "increasingly migratory character of American society" on
historical divorce law).
17. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A I (discussing a federal lawsuit seeking invalidation of
California's Proposition 8 and some gay rights advocates' discomfort with the lawsuit).
18. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict ofLaws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1968-2007 (1997) (arguing that the Defense
of Marriage Act is unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
19. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and
Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 729-57 (2004); Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex
Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 KING'S C. L.J. 63, 66 (2004); Andrew Koppelman,
Against Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 205, 209 (2005); Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A
Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce is an Incident of Marriage
that Should be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the United States, 50 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 225, 244-45 (2010); Ramais, supra note 2, at 1028-31.
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legislators, rather than judges, can solve the same-sex divorce
problem, an idea that has been almost completely ignored in the
academic literature. Part III goes on to argue that in states where
same-sex marriage is legal, any same-sex couple married in the state
should be allowed to return there to divorce, regardless of residence
or domicile. That is, those states should not enforce divorce residency
or domicile requirements against same-sex couples who married in
the state, even if the couple moved out of (or never resided in) the
state. Most scholars who have mentioned legislative solutions at all
have assumed that this solution is foreclosed by Williams v. North
Carolina (Williams II),2" which has been read to say that residency
requirements for divorce are constitutionally mandated.22 Looking to
both historical divorce laws and principles of jurisdiction, Part III
argues that this reading is wrong and that legislative solutions,
including allowing any same-sex couple married in a state to divorce
there, are possible.
This Article ends by summarizing the most practical solutions to
the same-sex divorce problem for judges, legislators, and same-sex
couples. This area of law is complex and constantly evolving, and the
best route for those concerned about the same-sex divorce problem is
to pursue both judicial and legislative solutions.
I. WHY SAME-SEX DIVORCE MATTERS
Divorce is best understood as a derivative benefit of marriage,
providing a neutral adjudicator and a relatively dignified ending for
marriages that don't last. Beyond the important questions of property
allocation and custody division, divorce frees couples from marriages
that may have been abusive or unbearable, erasing the legal
connection and allowing the spouses to remarry.
So far, the number of formal same-sex divorces has been
relatively lOW. 23 That's partly because there wasn't, until recently,
20. The two brief discussions are found in Kay, supra note 19, at 89-90, and Ramais,
supra note 2, at 1037-38.
21. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
22. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role ofFederalism in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1703, 1798-99.
23. Statistics on gay divorce are not officially tracked, but the Boston Globe reported
in an "informal survey" that 35 to 45 of the 7,300 couples married in Massachusetts
between 2003 and 2006 had divorced. Conant, supra note 8 (citing Matt Carroll, The Gay
Divorcees, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2006, at E4). There are only about a dozen cases of
couples who tried to divorce after moving out of states that recognize gay marriage. One
interesting note is that the G oodridges, the plaintiffs in Goodridge v. Dep't ofPub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the case that first legalized same-sex marriage in the United
2011]
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much same-sex marriage. American couples have been able to obtain
Vermont civil unions since 2000, and could marry in Canada
beginning in 2003.24 But the first American state to recognize gay
marriage, Massachusetts, did so in 2003 and limited marriage to
resident couples until 2008.25 Since 2008, couples have been able to
legally marry in seven states and the District of Columbia.26 As these
marriages age, the number of couples seeking divorce will grow, and
the problem of same-sex divorce will become more urgent.
The same-sex divorce problem presents compelling questions for
people across the ideological spectrum, even for those who do not
support same-sex marriage. Anyone who believes that divorce is a
fundamental part of personal freedom should care about same-sex
divorce. Moreover, anyone who supports gay marriage should pay
attention to the issue. Because the lack of access to divorce may keep
some couples from marrying, this is one of many issues that will have
to be resolved if gay marriage rates are to match the number of gay
couples that want to marry.27
There are also reasons that those who are lukewarm or openly
hostile to gay marriage might look at divorce in a different light.
Many people support some rights for gay individuals or couples, but
stop short of endorsing civil unions or marriage.28 This ambivalence is
reflected in the policies of some states. A small handful of states
neither allow gay marriage nor forbid it by statute or constitutional
amendment.29 Other states explicitly forbid gay marriage but have
other protections for gay individuals and couples, including anti-
States, are now separated. Katie Zezima, Same-Sex Marriage Plaintiffs Separate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2006, at All.
24. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1204 (2000); Halpern v. Att'y Gen. of Can. (2003), 65
O.R. 3d 161,199-200 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
25. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941, was the basis for the creation of same-sex marriage.
The Massachusetts laws now contain no special provisions for same-sex marriage; it is
simply not one of the prohibited categories listed in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 1-14
(2003). The residency legislation was repealed by the Act of July 31, 2008, 2008 MASS.
ACTS ch. 216, § 1. SeeRamais, supra note 2, at 1014 n.6.
26. Gay marriage is currently legal in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New
Hampshire, Vermont, New York, and the District of Columbia. See Same-Sex Marriage,
supra note 15 (summarizing gay marriage and gay rights laws). Additionally, same-sex
couples were able to marry in California for over five months in 2008. See Bob Egelko,
Same-Sex Marriage Issue Back to Top State Court, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6,2008, at A 19.
27. See supra note 1.
28. Andrew Gelman, Gay Rights Are Popular in Many Dimensions,
FIVETHIRTYE IGHT.COM (June 13, 2009, 8:05 PM), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06
/gay-rights-are-popular-in-many.html (citing a graph by Professors Jeffrey Lax and Justin
Phillips showing the state-by-state popularity of various gay rights measures).
29. See infra note 44.
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discrimination laws and hospital visitation rights.30 Judges in these in-
between states have recognized the need to provide for structured
dissolutions of long-term same-sex relationships--especially those
that involve children or significant assets31-and the American Law
Institute has published guidelines for dissolving "nonmarital
relationships."3 In short, many people have recognized that two
people whose lives are intertwined may need the assistance of the
state to separate, and that assisting in a separation is conceptually
different from validating and supporting the initial relationship.
Citizens or legislators who do not support gay marriage but are
willing to extend some practical benefits to gay couples might decide
that divorce is a necessary benefit.
Even those who do not support gay rights at all might recognize
the special case that divorce presents. In many states, legislators or
voters have passed laws providing that the state will not recognize
out-of-state same-sex unions or extend any other rights to gay
individuals and couples.33 It is difficult to argue that such states should
extend the benefit of divorce to same-sex couples when those couples
receive no other benefits-although it certainly is bizarre for gay-
marriage opponents to argue that a gay couple mustremain married.34
There are, however, a few unique problems worthy of mention. If a
state refuses to grant a same-sex couple a divorce, the state may then
have to decide whether to allow the spouses to remarry new partners
of the opposite sex.35 Denying the right to remarry is fundamentally
inconsistent with refusing to recognize the underlying marriage, but
allowing the remarriage creates a form of bigamy. Imagine our
Pennsylvania couple again. Suppose one of the women in the
relationship decides to marry a man. Pennsylvania refuses to allow
30. Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 15.
31. See generally John M. Yarwood, Note, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-DOMA
States, Migratory States, Marriage, Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division,
89 B.U. L. REV. 1355 (2009) (discussing property division rules for cohabitating,
unmarried couples).
32. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002).
33. See infra note 44; see also Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2165 (collecting statutes
that prohibit states from recognizing marriages validly celebrated in other states).
34. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2 (" 'There are people who are so against gay
relationships they won't let us get into committed relationships, and they won't let us get
out of them either.' ").
35. Of course, as one person in this situation noted, being unable to divorce may
create non-legal problems in seeking new relationships: "When you're newly single and
starting to date, it's awkward: 'I just want you to know I happen to be married in five
states.'" Meinzer, supra note 1.
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her to divorce her wife, but she is nonetheless allowed to marry the
man. Whenever she travels to Massachusetts-or any other state that
recognizes same-sex marriage-she is suddenly a bigamist. If she gets
into an accident in Massachusetts, there would be a dispute over
which spouse is entitled to make medical decisions. If a daughter from
the first marriage goes to Harvard and tries to fill out financial aid
forms, it will be unclear whom to list as "parents." That may be a
problem for Massachusetts to solve, but perhaps, especially in a time
of a transient population, judges and legislators in every state should
avoid exacerbating the problem. As the Supreme Court put it in an
early case about inter-state recognition of opposite-sex divorces,
"society ... has an interest in the avoidance of polygamous
marriages and in the protection of innocent offspring of marriages
deemed legitimate in other jurisdictions."36
Another issue involves a different aspect of the same-sex divorce
problem. Even if a same-sex couple succeeds in divorcing in a state
that recognizes their marriage, other states may not enforce divorce
obligations, such as alimony.37 A state that refuses to recognize same-
sex divorces granted in other states runs the risk of becoming a
"haven[]" for gay individuals seeking to avoid obligations under
divorce settlements. For instance, one mother who converted to
Christianity and renounced her partner moved from Vermont to
Virginia with the couple's daughter in an attempt to avoid Vermont's
resolution of the custody dispute.39 Despite relatively clear law
governing custody disputes between legal parents, the case has
spawned years of litigation." Judges and legislators in states that
36. Williams v. North Carolina ( Williams]), 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
37. Koppelman, supra note 19, at 209 ("More generally, blanket nonrecognition
would mean that states following that rule would become havens for avoiding obligations
of spousal property and child support that had been validly entered into pursuant to
Massachusetts law.").
38. Id.
39. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Va. Ct. App. 2006)
(construing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to require that Virginia give full faith
and credit to Vermont's custody and visitation orders in a child custody dispute involving
estranged same-sex members of a civil union); Padraic Maroney, With Gay Marriage
Comes... Gay Divorce, EDGE BOSTON, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.edgeboston.com/index
.php?ch=entertainment&sc=culture&sc3=&id=103669&pf-l (noting the publicity and
interstate tensions generated by same-sex divorce).
40. Child custody decisions can be one of the most difficult parts of divorce
proceedings, but the issue is not necessarily raised by the gay divorce cases, and few of the
cases mentioned in this Article involve custody issues. Under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 9 (1A) U.L.A. 657 (1997) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2010), any legal parent can litigate custody of a child, regardless of the
parents' marital status. It is not clear, however, how the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
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forbid gay marriage should be alert to this type of forum shopping
and develop ways to avoid it.
II. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SAME-SEX DIVORCE PROBLEM
There are only about a dozen cases dealing with same-sex
relationship dissolution. There would doubtless be more, but some
gay couples who were advised that divorces could not be obtained
have resolved their separation issues without a divorce, for better or
for worse." This Part will describe some of the most important cases
in detail, both to show the often-haphazard nature of gay divorce
litigation and to illustrate the different theories that judges are using
to grant or deny divorce petitions from same-sex couples.
Despite the variety of laws governing divorce and same-sex
relationships, judges faced with divorce petitions from same-sex
couples are generally trying to answer the same question: does the
state statute allowing the judge to end a marriage via divorce apply to
same-sex marriages? More specifically, when the word "marriage" is
used in a divorce statute, what does it mean? Judges have taken a
variety of analytical approaches to answer these seemingly
straightforward questions. The cases are too few and too scattered to
identify consistent trends over time or in different jurisdictions, but
courts seem to be gradually arriving at a more nuanced jurisprudence.
This Part will discuss the cases in approximate order of increasing
sophistication, which corresponds roughly with chronological order.
In a few early cases, judges made their decisions entirely based on
equity and the feeling that something ought to be done for the same-
sex couple. In other early cases, judges quickly dismissed divorce
petitions on the ground that the long-ago legislatures that enacted the
divorce statutes decades earlier could not have meant them to apply
to same-sex marriages. More recently, several courts have analyzed
their states' divorce statutes with specific reference to the principles
and jurisprudence that have historically governed marriage
recognition. These different approaches have produced varied results
Act would apply to a non-biological parent who had not formally adopted the child. See
§ 1738A(b) (failing to explicitly define "parent").
41. See Jamie Stengle, Court Will Decide If Homosexual Couples Married Elsewhere
Can GetDivorcedin Texas, CNSNEWS.COM, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.cnsnews.com/news
/article/court-will-decide-if-homosexual-couples-married-e lsewhere-can-get-divorced-
texas (noting that same-sex couple had worked out a custody arrangement before realizing
same-sex divorce might be available). See generally Meinzer, supra note 1 (noting the use
of annulments and mediation services in lieu of divorce).
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and, in some cases, judges have reached different results while
applying the same analytical method to the same statute.
In addition to judges, academics have also been trying to work
out the theoretical issues raised by same-sex divorce petitions. Thus,
after describing the cases, this Part will flesh out some of the
suggestions by scholars and point out potential problems with these
suggestions in light of the caselaw and the nuanced family law that
exists within each state. This Part will evaluate which academic
theories have the most potential and how they might be modified to
be most useful in the real world.
In discussing the cases and the scholarship, this Part will point to
pertinent state laws regulating same-sex unions, which are referred to
as "mini-DOMAs." Section 2 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) provides
No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State ... or a right or
claim arising from such relationship.42
Contrary to popular belief, states have never been required to
recognize other states' marriages under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause or any other constitutional provision, although states generally
do so as a matter of course.43 Section 2 of DOMA, therefore, codified
what history had already established. States' mini-DOMAs, which can
be either statutory or constitutional, are further barriers to ensure
that a state will not be forced to recognize other states' gay unions
against its residents' will.' Some are relatively narrow, merely
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2010). DOMA is codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2010). The Department of Justice announced earlier this year that it would not
defend section 3 of DOMA, which prohibits the federal government from recognizing
same-sex marriage, in court. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House ofRepresentatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available athttp://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/February/ Il-ag-223.html. This Article deals with section 2 of
DOMA.
43. See Mark P. Strasser, DOMA and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1011, 1017
(2010) ("Yet, even before same-sex marriage was a contentious issue in the United States,
there was a long history of states refusing to recognize marriages validly celebrated
elsewhere. The problem that DOMA was allegedly designed to solve-namely, protecting
states from their domiciliaries who might enter into a same-sex marriage in Hawaii and
then return home demanding that it be recognized-was not really a problem at all.").
44. Forty-two states have some sort of mini-DOMA legislation; many of those have
both statutory and constitutional mini-DOMAs. Twenty-nine states have constitutional
mini-DOMAs. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXX, § 1;ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. I,
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defining marriage as between a man and a woman; others are very
broad, banning judicial enforcement of contracts that replicate the
benefits of marriage.45
A. Equity Cases
In the earliest cases, judges largely sidestepped legal analysis in
favor of more intuitive decisionmaking. This Section will describe
those cases and the reactions they provoked. Professor Barbara Cox
§ 31; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, I I; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 25; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A; MO. CONST. art. I § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7;
NEB. CONST. art. t, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST.
art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII,
§ 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. Hawaii's
constitutional amendment simply gives the legislature the authority to limit marriage to
couples of different sexes. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Thirty-nine states have statutory mini-
DOMAs. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010);ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011, .013
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, -112 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, -109
(2009), 9-11-208 (Supp. 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300 (West Supp. 2011), 308.5 (West
2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-104, -112 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2009);
FLA. STAT.ANN. §§ 741.04, .212 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2010); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-201, -209 (2006); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/201,/212 (West 1999),/213.1 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-
1-1 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101, -115 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 402.005, .020, .040, .045 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 89 (Supp. 2011), 96
(1999), 3520 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE.ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, .271, .272 (West
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01, 518.01 (West 2006), 517.03 (West Supp. 2011); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-1-103, -401 (2011); N.C. G EN. STAT. §§ 51.1,.2 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-01, -
08 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 3 (West Supp. 2011), 3.1 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2007); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, -15 (Supp. 2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, -38 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2010); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, -4,-4.1 (LexisNexis
2007); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-45.2, -45.3 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010-.020
(West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.001(2), 765.01 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2011); see also Same-Sex
Marriage, supra note 15 (noting which states have constitutional amendments and
statutes). For a general discussion of mini-DOMA legislation, see Andrew Koppelman,
The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265,265-66 (2007).
45. Compare, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 30, § 1 ("Only a union of one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state."), with, e.g., VA. CONST.
art. I, § 15-A ("This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage .. "). For further
background on this issue, the best resource is Andrew Koppelman's excellent reference
guide to state laws governing gay unions. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2165.
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has researched these cases extensively, and this Section draws on her
analysis in describing them.46
The first partially successful civil union dissolution case was
initially handled with minimal fuss and minimal law. In 2003, Russell
Smith and John Anthony, two men who had been joined in a
Vermont civil union, filed for divorce in Texas state court.4 7 The
dissolution was an "amicable, agreed-upon matter."48 After a day of
discussion with the parties, the judge decided that Texas courts are
courts of general jurisdiction and that the parties had the equivalent
of a contract calling for property division.4 9 He therefore concluded
he had jurisdiction, heard the case, divided the property, and
dissolved the civil union.5"
Less than a month later, the Texas Attorney General objected to
this outcome in a press release: there was no procedure under Texas
law for dissolution of a civil union, he argued, and no marriage
existed in the first place.51 The judge could have responded that, as a
court of general jurisdiction, he did not need a specific procedure to
make an equitable division of property.52 Instead, he vacated the
order, and the plaintiff withdrew his petition because "he couldn't
afford to fight the attorney general.""
A similar case in Iowa, In re KJB & JSP,54 had a different
outcome. A lesbian couple had a Vermont civil union." Although
they were not married under Vermont law, they filed a standard
divorce petition in 2003 in Iowa alleging that they had been married
in Vermont. 6 The judge granted the divorce. 7 As he "started to hand
the papers back to ... the lawyer for one of the women," the judge
46. See Cox, supra note 19, at 699.
47. Id. at 736; see also Molly McDonough, Court OKs Divorce Without Recognizing
Marriage': Gay Couple's Civil Union, Created in Vermont, Is Dissolved in Texas, 2 No. 11
A.B.A. J. eReport 2 (Mar. 21, 2003) (describing the Texas case).
48. McDonough, supra note 47.
49. See id.; Cox, supra note 19, at 736.
50. Cox, supra note 19, at 736; see also McDonough, supra note 47 (writing that the
judge "ordered a straightforward no-fault divorce decree and civil union dissolution").
51. McDonough, supra note 47; see also Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2 (noting the
unique problem of deciding whether a "marriage" exists).
52. See Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (explaining that
Texas state district courts are courts of general jurisdiction).
53. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2.
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suddenly realized both divorce petitioners were women." When the
lawyer explained that the couple had a Vermont civil union, however,
the judge decided that " '[i]f people have disputes, and they ... live
here, then they should have access to the judicial system,' "9 so he did
not vacate the divorce. But the media noticed, and a firestorm
ensued.6 °  A large group of would-be intervenors-state
representatives, a pastor, and a church, among others-filed a
petition arguing that the divorce could not be granted because civil
unions did not exist in Iowa and two women could not be married
under Iowa law.6
After the Iowa Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene
for lack of standing,62 the trial judge rewrote his earlier opinion,
resituating the dissolution action in the context of a civil union.63 He
acknowledged that he would have lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a
"marriage" between two women.' Nonetheless, he decided that he
could make an equitable termination of a civil union, a concept
foreign to Iowa law. 65 His final decision "did not cite Iowa
precedent"; rather, it was based on his belief that " '[w]e can't turn
people away from our court system and say we can't resolve your
disputes .... [T]his [is] a dispute between parties that in some way
I'm going to have to solve.' ",66 Like the judge in Texas, the Iowa
judge faced considerable criticism for his decision, but, unlike his
Texas counterpart, he did not vacate it.
67
58. Kathleen Burge, Iowa Judge Causes Stir in Granting Gay Divorce, BOS. GLOBE,
Dec. 13, 2003, at B4. They are not the only same-sex couple to try to get a divorce by
fudging that critical fact; one wonders how many other couples have succeeded. See
O'Darling v. O'Darling, 2008 OK 71, 2, 188 P.3d 137, 138 (Okla. 2008) (permitting the
trial judge to vacate its own ruling when "[t]he style of the case did not indicate that the
marriage was between two women ... [and] [t]he notary's signature block on the waiver
referred to the signor as he/she"). The women filed a divorce petition in which they
identified themselves only by their first initials and last name. See Arthur Leonard,
Oklahoma Supreme Court Sends Mixed Signals on Same-Sex Divorce, LEONARD LINK
(July 3, 2008), http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2008/07/oklahoma-
suprem.html (commenting on the 0 'Darlingcase).
59. Burge, supra note 58.
60. See id.; see also Cox, supra note 19, at 743 (describing the public backlash to the
judge's initial ruling).
61. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court Woodbury Cnty., 698 N.W.2d 858, 862 (Iowa 2005)
(enumerating the petitioners).
62. Id. at 874.
63. Cox, supra note 19, at 744 & n.195.
64. Id. at 744.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Steve King, 5th Cong. Dist. of Iowa, Same-
Sex Marriage and Judge Neary-Made Law (Oct. 20, 2004), available athttp://www.house
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Despite these early cases, the use of equitable jurisdiction to
solve the same-sex divorce problem has received no academic
attention. That lacuna may exist, in part, because there is not much
theory to explain: judges merely invoke their general jurisdiction to
explain why they can grant a divorce petition from a same-sex couple,
then follow standard divorce procedures. Additionally, this solution
would not work in every state, since some family courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, and some mini-DOMAs explicitly strip
jurisdiction over same-sex divorce cases from the family courts. 6 But
the most important reason that equitable jurisdiction has received
limited attention may be that the same-sex divorce problem is now
fairly well-known, so judges have access to more literature explaining
how they can approach divorce petitions, and they are trying to write
decisions that will stand up to public scrutiny.
69
B. Originalism Cases
In Rosengarten v. Downes,7" a Connecticut court took on what
would be the first civil union dissolution case to focus on a statute
rather than equity. This Section describes that case and one other
substantial originalist opinion on the same-sex divorce issue.
The Rosengarten plaintiff had a Vermont civil union but lived in
Connecticut.7 He sought dissolution because he was ill and wanted to
ensure that his children, rather than his partner, would inherit his
assets.72 Under the Connecticut family code, the family court had
jurisdiction over "matters affecting or involving: (1) Dissolution of
marriage."73 But the parties conceded that a civil union was not a
marriage as contemplated by Connecticut law or Vermont law, so that
provision was inapposite.74 Instead, the plaintiff argued that the court
had jurisdiction over the matter under a catch-all clause in the family
.gov/apps/list/press/iaO5_king/oped_041020.html; see also Burge, supra note 58 (noting the
disposition of the Texas case).
68. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art I, § IV; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2010); Chambers v.
Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 & n.l (R.I. 2007) (explaining that the Rhode Island Family
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction).
69. The first substantial articles covering the same-sex divorce issue were published in
2004. See generally, e.g., Cox, supra note 19; Kay, supra note 19 (examining same-sex
divorce for one of the first times in academia). More cases have accumulated since the first
case in 2002. See infra notes 70, 102, and 108.
70. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
71. Id. at 172.
72. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2.
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-1(1) (West 2009).
74. Rosengarten, 802 A.2d. at 172, 174-77.
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code, which encompassed "all such other matters within the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court concerning children or family
relations as may be determined by the judges of said court."75
The court took an originalist view of the divorce statute and
rejected the couple's petition.76 The primary question, as the court
saw it, was whether the legislature had demonstrated any intent to
include civil union litigation in the catch-all provision, which was
enacted in 1976. 7 Unsurprisingly, the court found that the answer was
no.78 The plaintiff appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court and
certiorari was granted, but the ill partner died before the appeal was
complete .79
A few years later, a Rhode Island appellate court took a similar
view in Chambers v. Ormiston,° the best known of the gay divorce
decisions. Two women, Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston,
were married in Massachusetts8 and later sought a divorce in Rhode
Island, where they lived.82 The Rhode Island Family Court was a
court of limited jurisdiction with no catch-all jurisdictional clause;
thus, the parties filed under a provision authorizing the court to "hear
and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage."83
The majority analyzed the word "marriage" solely in light of the
legislature's intent, asking whether the legislature that had enacted
the statute in 1961 meant to include same-sex marriage.84 Again, the
majority had little difficulty concluding that the 1961 legislature
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-1(17) (West 2009).
76. Rosengarten, 802 A.2d. at 177-80, 184.
77. Id. at 177-78.
78. Id.
79. Cox, supra note 19, at 729; Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2.
80. 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). Chambers is the only gay divorce decision to date with a
dissenting opinion. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
81. They were married despite the residential bar, that is, the provision of the
Massachusetts marriage statute specifying that a same-sex marriage could only be
performed in Massachusetts when it would not be void in the couple's home state.
Chambers, 935 A.2d at 968-69 & n.23 (Suttell, J., dissenting). Massachusetts authorities
examined Rhode Island law and decided that the marriage would not be void under a lex
locicelebrationis theory, a conclusion the Rhode Island Attorney General later approved,
and therefore allowed the Rhode Island residents to marry. Id at 972-73 (allowing the
Rhode Island residents to marry); see Katie Zezima, Rhode Island Steps Toward
Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A19 (reporting the
announcement by the Rhode Island Attorney General that same-sex marriages performed
in Massachusetts should be recognized in Rhode Island).
82. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958-59 (majority opinion).
83. Id.at 961.
84. Id. at 961-65.
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intended no such thing.85 The court ended with the admission that
"sometimes our decisions result in palpable hardship to the persons
affected by them," but stated that the legislature, not the court, would
have to change the law. 6 Two dissenters, discussed below, took a
different view of the case, and argued that the divorce should have
been granted. 7 The parties in this case have remained particularly
frustrated and vocal; after filing a subsequent unsuccessful divorce
suit in Rhode Island, Ms. Ormiston gave in and decided to move to
Massachusetts."8
There is not much academic support for the analysis in these two
cases. As explained in the next two Sections, scholars have advocated
defining "marriage" under a set of traditional rules unique to the
family law context, rather than employing the originalist method of
determining the intent of the legislature that enacted the family
code.89 In addition to this methodological criticism, Matthew Skinner,
the student author of an article focused on the Rhode Island
Chambers case, has pointed to another reason to take issue with the
analysis of the Chambers and Rosengarten courts.9 To discern what
the 1961 legislators meant by the word "marriage," the Chambers
court relied solely on three dictionaries from that era. 91 First, Skinner
points out that those dictionaries did not make any mention of same-
sex marriage, although there is unambiguous evidence that some gay
authors in that period were using the term to refer to same-sex
unions. 92 More importantly, relying solely on dictionary definitions
allowed the Chambers court to avoid discussing the obvious reason
that the 1961 legislators almost certainly did not believe that marriage
could include same-sex couples.93 In the 1950s,
[t]he dominant view of [gay people was] as perverts,
psychopaths, deviates, and the like.... [They were] [s]hunted
to the margins of American society [and] harassed because of
their sexuality .... Whether seen from the vantage point of
85. Id.
86. Id. at 966-67.
87. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
88. Divorce Hard to Get for Some Gay Couples, supra note 7.
89. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
90. Matthew J. Skinner, Comment, To Harm, to Victimize, and to Destroy: The Ugly
Reason Why the Chambers Majority Opinion Was So Right, 72 ALB. L. REV. 825, 827-28
(2009).
91. Id. at 830.
92. Id. at 835-49.
93. Id. at 831,850-51.
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religion, medicine, or the law, the homosexual or lesbian was a
flawed individual, not a victim of injustice.
94
In Rhode Island, police began a " 'concerted antihomosexual
vice campaign[]'" in the 1950s.95 In 1962, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court upheld a sodomy conviction for a man engaged in a consensual
same-sex encounter.96 In rejecting the defendant's argument that the
law did not provide fair notice, the court wrote that "[i]t would not be
reasonable to require a legislature to anticipate and describe in other
than comprehensive terms all of the bizarre means for perverting the
sexual function that are conceived by depraved minds."97
In other words, the 1961 Rhode Island legislators doubtless did
not mean "marriage" to include same-sex marriage-but that is
because, in that era, gay people were considered shameful deviates,
when they were considered at all.9" It is troubling for a current court
to rely on the assumptions and prejudices of long-ago legislatures,
particularly in states that have rejected those assumptions and
provided some protections to gay people and couples.99
C. Lex Loci Celebrationis Cases
Although none of the foregoing cases relied on it, there is a
traditional rule for deciding when an out-of-state marriage is valid in
another state. The lex loci celebrationis ("law of the place of
celebration") rule prescribes that a state will recognize a marriage
contracted in another forum, so long as the marriage is not offensive
to the state's public policy.' The rule has been used, for instance, to
decide whether the husband of an interracial couple, validly married
in one state, could inherit from his late wife in a state that banned
interracial marriage.1"' Despite the unquestioned historical
94. Id. at 847 (quoting JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES:
THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 53
(2d ed. 1998)).
95. Id. at 848 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 64(1999)).
96. Id. at 849-50 (citing State v. Milne, 187 A.2d 136, 140 (R.I. 1962)).
97. Milne, 187 A.2d at 140.
98. See Skinner, supra note 90, at 847, 851-52.
99. Rhode Island is one of the only states that does not permit same-sex marriage but
has never had a mini-DOMA. See supra note 44. At the time of the Rosengarten case,
Connecticut had laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
allowed same-sex couples to adopt. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 179-82 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002).
100. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13(2010).
101. Cox, supra note 19, at 724-25 (citing Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss.
1948)).
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dominance of this rule, it has played a determinative role in
surprisingly few of the same-sex divorce cases. Courts in only one
state-New York-have explicitly analyzed the cases under the lex
loci celebrationis rubric. This Section explores New York's caselaw
and the reasons that it is difficult to translate to other states.
There are a number of same-sex divorce cases from New York.
The most important is Beth R. v. Donna M., 102 a case involving
lesbians married in Canada. The Beth R. judge began by reciting the
lex loci celebrationis principle, writing that an out-of-state marriage is
valid in New York unless forbidden by strong public policy, such as
policies against incest and polygamy." 3 The judge then exhaustively
canvassed the out-of-state marriages New York had allowed to stand:
for instance, an adulterer remarrying in the nineteenth century; a
marriage involving an underage spouse; certain incestuous marriages,
including marriages between cousins; common-law marriages; and
marriages by proxy."° Next, the judge turned to the evidence that
same-sex marriage was not repugnant to New York's public policy,
citing executive department memoranda that allowed same-sex
couples married out of state to receive certain benefits under New
York law.1"5 Finally, the judge noted that the recent case of
Hernandez v. Robles"°6 neither compelled state officials to recognize
gay marriage nor forbade them to do so. Taking all these factors
together, the judge granted the divorce.0 7
A different New York appellate court reasoned along the same
lines in C.M. v. C.C., '8 citing Beth R. approvingly.'09 By that time, late
2008, there were two additional factors in favor of a finding that gay
marriage was not repugnant to New York public policy: an appellate
division case finding that same-sex marriages solemnized out of state
should be recognized in New York,"0 and a memorandum from then-
Governor David Paterson's legal counsel to the executive department
to the same effect."' With gay marriage now broadly recognized in
102. 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
103. Id. at 504.
104. Id. at 505-06.
105. Id.
106. 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006).
107. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (citing Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6).
108. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
109. Id. at 886.
110. SeeMartinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
111. Memorandum from David Nocenti, Counsel to Former Governor David Paterson,
to Gov't Agency Counsel (May 14, 2008), availableathttp://www.observer.com/2008
[Vol. 90
THE PROBLEM OF SAME-SEXDIVORCE
New York, and no statutory or constitutional mini-DOMA limiting
same-sex marriage, it took no great leap for the court to agree to
grant the divorce."
2
Unlike New York, the vast majority of states have some sort of
statutory or constitutional mini-DOMA." 3 In those states, judges
applying the lex loci celebrationis rule have to grapple with the
question whether recognizing the marriage would be against public
policy. As Professor Joanna Grossman has demonstrated, that
question is not as straightforward as it might appear. "4 Historically,
the public policy exception has been construed very narrowly, as it is
important to maintain stability and to respect settled expectations in
the marriage arena."5 In past marriage recognition cases, it was
generally agreed that "a mere statutory prohibition of a particular
type of marriage" was not enough to invoke the public policy
exception." 6 For example, if state A had a law prohibiting marriages
between first cousins, state A would still recognize first-cousin
marriages from other states because the statute did not amount to a
public policy against first-cousin marriages."7 Even a statute declaring
a certain type of marriage "void" was not always enough to invoke
the public policy exception to the lex loci celebrationis rule."8 Only
two types of statutes clearly triggered the public policy exception:
statutes criminalizing particular marriages and statutes that explicitly
said that a certain type of out-of-state marriage would not be
recognized even if it were valid where performed." 9
/patersons-message-same-sex-marriage; see also C.M, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (quoting the
letter from former Governor Paterson's legal advisor).
112. C.M, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887-89.
113. Forty-two states have a statutory mini-DOMA, a constitutional mini-DOMA, or
both. See supra note 44.
114. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-
Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433,465-67 (2005).
115. See id.at 465-66.
116. Id. at 465.
117. See id. at 465-67.
118. Id. at 466 (citing Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn.
1979); Maurer v. Maurer, 60 A.2d 440,443 (Pa. 1948)).
119. Id. at 466 (citing Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 471 (1873); In reMiller's
Estate, 214 N.W. 428, 430 (Mich. 1927); In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953);
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 32-33 (1881)); see also United States ex rel. Devine
v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886, 888 (D. Pa. 1901) (refusing to recognize an uncle-niece relationship
that would have been criminal in Pennsylvania); In re G--, 6 I. & N. Dec. 337, 337 (BIA
1954) (same); In re Hirabayashi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1964) (recognizing a
marriage between first cousins in part because there was no law in the state criminalizing
such marriages). But see In re C--, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 632 (BIA 1952) (allowing uncle-
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After Lawrence v. Texas,"'° where the Supreme Court held that
consensual same-sex sexual conduct is part of the liberty interest
protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 2' no state could pass a statute criminalizing same-sex
marriages. However, there are many mini-DOMAs that expressly
provide that same-sex marriages will not be recognized even if they
were validly celebrated in another state.122 A 2009 case from Indiana
provides a good example of this situationY.2 3 Two women who had
married in Canada sought a divorce in Indiana. 124 The women had
already divided their personal property and financial accounts, so the
divorce's practical effect would likely have been only psychic relief
and freedom to remarry. 125 Under Indiana law, divorce can be granted
for "[i]rretrievable breakdown of the marriage.' ' 26 However, Indiana
law also provides that "[a] marriage between persons of the same
gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place
where it is solemnized."'27 In a brief order, the judge recognized that
Indiana's mini-DOMA explicitly barred application of the lex loci
celebrationis rule in the context of same-sex marriages, so she could
not apply the divorce statute. 28 She noted that:
As the State of Indiana has chosen to prohibit same sex
marriage as a matter of public policy, it might logically follow
that Indiana would have a policy interest in granting same sex
divorce. However, the General Assembly has not enacted a
statute which confers upon the courts the authority to dissolve
same sex marriages in the same manner as marriages between a
man and a woman.'29
niece marriage to stand in Pennsylvania because of BIA's view that Pennsylvania
authorities would not criminally prosecute a couple lawfully married elsewhere).
120. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
121. Id.at 578.
122. Grossman, supra note 114, at 477 & nn.69-71 (listing the thirty-eight states with
such mini-DOMAs in 2005).
123. Order on Petition for Dissolution of Marriage at 1, In re Marriage of Tara Ranzy
& Larissa Chism, No. 49D12-0903-DR-014654 (Marion Cnty. Super. Ct., Ind. Sept. 4,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
124. Id.
125. Seeid. at 2.
126. IND.CODE § 31-15-2-3 (2007).
127. IND.CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2007).
128. Order on Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 123, at 2-3.
129. Id.
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Thus, in a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation, the
court dismissed the petition for divorce. 3 ° Courts in Pennsylvania and
Wyoming have reached similar conclusions. 3'
In states with mini-DOMAs similar to Indiana's, or in states with
mini-DOMAs that explicitly declare same-sex marriage to be against
the state's strong public policy, judges likely must refuse to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages under the public policy exception,
subject to the federal constitutional concerns discussed below.'32
However, in states with narrower mini-DOMAs-those that merely
provide that the state will not marry same-sex couples, or declare
same-sex marriages void-judges should be able to apply the lex loci
celebrationis rule in its traditional form. Alternatively, as several
academics have suggested, judges could apply the lex loci celebrationis
rule in a modified narrow form, discussed in the next Section.
D. Incidents Analysis
The rule of lex loci celebrationis is meant to determine when an
out-of-state marriage is valid.'33 Throughout the history of marriage
litigation, however, judges and litigants have been concerned with a
narrower variant on that question: when is a marriage valid for a
particular purpose? Deciding a marriage's validity only for a
particular purpose is known as "incidents analysis," and several
scholars who have studied same-sex divorce have advocated that
judges look at the divorce question in light of incidents analysis.
3 4
This Section will explain the basic concept, illustrate how it has been
used in the caselaw, and evaluate the scholarship on incidents
analysis. This Section will also consider whether judges can use
130. Id. at 3.
131. SeeKern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 575-76 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. P1. 2010);
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 14, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo. 2011); see also
Jeremy Pelzer, Same-Sex Divorce Stirs Debate, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Billings, Wyo.), Jan.
14, 2011, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_7a8c5230-
2b3e-5a02-96b8-d90flafae69d.html (reporting on the Christiansen case); Jeanie Wright,
Same-Sex Divorce Case Appealed to High Court, LuSK HERALD (Lusk, Wyo.), Jan. 13,
2011, http://www.luskherald.com/v2_newsarticles.php?heading-0&page=72&storyid =
1681 (reporting that the Wyoming appeals court had declined to grant a divorce to a same-
sex couple married in Canada). That decision was recently overruled by the Wyoming
Supreme Court. See infra note 153.
132. For mini-DOMAs that explicitly declare same-sex marriage to be against public
policy, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520 (2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (LexisNexis 2008).
133. ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 13.
134. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 733-34; Koppelman, supra note 19, at 207-08;
Johnson, supra note 19, at 233-35.
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incidents analysis to avoid confronting the serious constitutional
questions raised by some states' mini-DOMAs.
The idea of this type of analysis is that marriage consists of a
series of "incidents," just as property ownership is commonly
conceptualized as a bundle of rights. 35 Incidents of marriage include,
for instance, the right to institute a wrongful death suit or the right to
inherit.'36 Instead of deciding whether a marriage is universally valid
or invalid, these scholars argue, courts should decide whether a
marriage is valid for the purpose of the specific incident being
litigated.'37 Under this theory, one might argue that divorce is simply
an incident of marriage-one set of rights tied to marriage-and that
courts should ask whether a same-sex marriage is valid only for the
purpose of divorcing the couple. 38
Incidents analysis enjoys considerable support in caselaw and
literature outside the context of same-sex unions. Conflicts-of-laws
scholars writing before the gay divorce issue arose supported an
incidents analysis of marriage, pointing out that "different incidents
of marriage involve[] different policies," and suggesting that
"determination of the validity of the marriage should be made with
reference to" the incident under dispute.'39 In fact, Professor Andrew
Koppelman has shown that the "blanket rule of nonrecognition" that
many states have imposed on same-sex marriage is historically
unprecedented. 40 Even in the case of miscegenation laws, marriages
135. Justin T. Wilson, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents
of Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 561, 676 (2007) ("Civil marriage is a bundle of rights, benefits, and responsibilities
that only the government can bestow."). See generallyJ.E. Penner, The "'Bundle ofRights"
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996) (discussing the conception of property
as a bundle of rights).
136. SeeCox, supranote 19, at 719.
137. See, e.g., id. at 718-22; Koppelman, supra note 19, at 207-08; Johnson, supra note
19, at 245-46.
138. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 718-22; Koppelman, supra note 19, at 207-08;
Johnson, supra note 19, at 245-46.
139. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.2 (4th ed. 2004); see also
Cox, supra note 19, at 719-21 (listing authorities in support of incidents analysis); Willis M.
Reese, Marriage in American Conflict ofLaws, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 952, 953 (1977)
(considering the validity of different types of marriage).
140. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2160-61. Historically, Professor Koppelman notes,
judges made distinctions between cases where marriages were "evasive" (the couple
married out of state because they knew the marriage was invalid in their home state);
"migratory" (the couple married in their home state but then moved to a state that did not
recognize the marriage); "visitor" (the couple was just passing through a state that did not
recognize the marriage); or "extraterritorial" (the couple's marital status was litigated
incident to some larger issue). Id. at 2145. The cases today, however, appear to have
totally dispensed with that analysis. Sometimes it is difficult to tell from the cases what
[Vol. 90
THE PROBLEM OF SAME-SEX DIVORCE
barred within a state were sometimes recognized for some purposes;
for instance, an interracial couple that was merely passing through a
state would have their marriage recognized. 4'
While incidents analysis has some intellectual and historical
appeal, it is also counterintuitive. Indeed, the simplest summary of
the opposition to gay divorce is that it is impossible to grant a divorce
without, on some level, recognizing the underlying marriage.142 We
are accustomed to thinking of marriage as a unitary whole; couples do
not opt into a checklist of rights when they obtain a marriage license.
Nonetheless, a few of the courts that have recently adjudicated same-
sex divorces have imported incidents analysis into their decisions-
some more than others, and some more coherently than others.
Analysis of four cases-from New Jersey, Wyoming, Rhode Island,
and Texas-ferrets out the ways in which the sometimes slippery
notion of incidents analysis has been employed.
1. Caselaw
A 2009 New Jersey case involved two women who had been
married in Canada.'43 Like the American states, Canada has a
residency requirement for divorce, so the couple could not divorce in
Canada. ' But since New Jersey did not recognize same-sex marriage,
it was not clear that the couple could divorce there. The court seemed
to sympathize with the couple's situation and worried aloud about
"the impact o[n] people in the society" of refusing access to divorce.'45
Rather than invoking general equitable principles, however, the
judge began by considering the lex loci celebrationis principle. In an
oral opinion, she emphasized the long-standing rule that marriages
validly contracted in other jurisdictions are valid in New Jersey, so
type of marriage is at issue. See, e.g., Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 559 (Berks
Cnty. Ct. Com. P1. 2010) (failing to specify whether marriage was migratory or evasive).
141. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2161.
142. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 736.
143. Transcript of Decision at 5-6, Hammond v. Hammond, No. FM-11-905-08-B (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 6, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
plaintiff was ill and had a short life expectancy; she wished to divorce a spouse with whom
she was no longer in a relationship and remarry in Canada so that the new wife would
have full rights in dealing with her medical care. Id. at 8-9. The New Jersey Attorney
General had issued a memorandum directing that out-of-state marriages were to be
treated as civil unions, and it would have been routine for the plaintiff to dissolve the
marriage as a civil union. Id. at 7-8. But because the plaintiff wanted to remarry in
Canada, she insisted on having a divorce from a marriage, not a dissolution of a civil
union, which Canadian officials might have refused to accept. Id at 8-9.
144. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. D-3, § 3(1) (Can.).
145. Transcript of Decision, supra note 143, at 24.
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long as they are not offensive to New Jersey's public policy.'46 Her
court granted twenty to twenty-five divorces a week, she noted, and
many had been contracted out of state; the rule was "just ingrained in
how we practice in family court."'47 The Attorney General had
conceded that the marriage was not offensive to New Jersey's public
policy.' The judge observed that "we would have a very different
situation" if New Jersey had enacted a mini-DOMA, but since it had
not, recognizing Canada's policy judgment did not "undercut the
different policy judgment" in New Jersey.'49
That analysis, though, would seem to imply that New Jersey
should recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages for allpurposes, not
just for divorce. The judge did not explain why divorce was different
from other incidents of marriage, but she did rely on incidents
analysis in an intuitive sort of way. She acknowledged that her
decision was at odds with the Attorney General's memorandum
directing that same-sex marriages be treated as civil unions, but
announced that she was "sort of carving out some sort of exception
from the Attorney General's opinion" for divorce."' 0 Her opinion, she
explained, was limited to the divorce context. 5 ' Although the lack of
uniformity troubled her, she thought it was outweighed by the need to
respect Canada's decisions, follow traditional principles of family law,
and make life simpler for gay couples by recognizing the Canadian
marriage and granting the divorce.'52
In a 2011 case, the Wyoming Supreme Court reached the same
result as the New Jersey court, but provided more analysis.
53
Wyoming law defined marriage as "a civil contract between a male
and a female person," but another provision of Wyoming law,
adopted much earlier, stated that "[a]ll marriage contracts which are
valid by the laws of the country in which they are contracted are valid
in this state."'54 The parties were a lesbian couple married in Canada,
so the latter provision appeared to apply to them, although the court
noted that previous cases had interpreted the statute to contain an
146. Id. at 12-15.
147. Id. at 15.
148. Id. at 18-19.
149. Id. at 18, 21.
150. Id. at 24.
151. Id. at 24, 26.
152. Id. at 24-26.
153. See Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 8-13, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo.
2011).
154. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1-101, -111(2011).
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exception for marriages that violated Wyoming's public policy.'55 The
court explained that when two provisions of Wyoming law appear to
conflict, judges should find a way to reconcile them if possible.'56 The
court found that the section defining marriage as between a man and
a woman regulated whether same-sex couples could enter marital
relationships in Wyoming but did not speak to whether Wyoming
could recognize a same-sex marriage for the purpose of divorce.57
The court explained:
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited
purpose of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen
the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the creation of
same-sex marriages. A divorce proceeding does not involve
recognition of a marriage as an ongoing relationship....
Specifically, Paula and Victoria are not seeking to live in
Wyoming as a married couple. They are not seeking to enforce
any right incident to the status of being married. In fact, it is
quite the opposite.... Respecting the law of Canada, as
allowed by § 20-1-111, for the limited purpose of accepting the
existence of a condition precedent to granting a divorce, is not
tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex
marriage. Thus, the policy of this state against the creation of
same-sex marriages is not violated.'58
Thus, the traditional lex loci celebrationis rule, as codified in the
statute, applied instead of the narrow mini-DOMA. The court noted
that "[n]othing in this opinion should be taken as applying to the
recognition of same-sex marriages legally solemnized in a foreign
jurisdiction in any context other than divorce."'5 9
The dissenters in the Rhode Island Chambers case offered a
different, but compelling, incidents analysis that focused on the
specific history of Rhode Island's divorce statute.160 As described
above, the Rhode Island majority simply concluded that the 1961
congress did not mean for the word "marriage" in the divorce statute
to include same-sex marriage.' 6' The dissenters agreed that the
meaning of "marriage" was the question and that examination of the
1961 legislature's intent was relevant, but came to a different
155. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 7, 253 P.3d at 156.
156. Id. at 8, 253 P.3d at 155.
157. Id. at 9, 253 P.3d at 156.
158. Id. at 12-13, 253 P.3d at 156-57.
159. Id. at 2,253 P.3d at 154 n.1.
160. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967-74 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J., dissenting).
161. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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conclusion.'62 The dissenters began by emphasizing that the "question
presented to this Court is extremely narrow in scope."'63 In their view,
the pertinent question was not what the legislature thought that
"marriage" meant in the abstract, but how broad the legislature
intended to make the forum for divorce."6 The dissenters found that
Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston were entitled to that forum for two
reasons.
First, the dissenters pointed out that the 1961 state congress
knew that even marriages that were void in Rhode Island, like
polygamous and incestuous marriages, could be terminated via
divorce under Rhode Island law.165 Second, the dissenters noted that
the 1961 congress was also familiar with the lex loci celebrationis rule.
The 1961 congress would therefore have understood that valid
marriages could exist in Rhode Island that would not have been
solemnized in Rhode Island, and that some of those couples might
eventually seek divorce within the State.'66 The dissenters found that
trying to pin down what the 1961 state congress meant by "marriage"
was useless, but that the available evidence supported a finding that
the congress intended to provide a broad forum for Rhode Island
citizens seeking to dissolve their unions.'67
Although most courts that have employed an incidents analysis
have ultimately granted the requested divorce, not all judges have
been persuaded. In State v. Naylo' 68 and In re Marriage of J.B. &
H.B.,'69 two Texas appellate courts recently used incidents analysis to
reach different conclusions on different divorce petitions, both from
same-sex couples married in Massachusetts. Under the Texas Family
Code, a court cannot "give effect to a public act, record, or judicial
proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates a marriage between
persons of the same sex or a civil union."'170 And under the Texas
Constitution, a court cannot "create or recognize" a same-sex
marriage. 7' The Naylor court, like the Wyoming Supreme Court,
suggested that the Texas mini-DOMAs might apply only to the
162. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 967-68 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 971.
165. Id. at 971 n.24.
166. Id. at 972-73.
167. Id. at 968, 972.
168. 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App. 2011).
169. 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
170. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c)(2) (West 2006).
171. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32(b).
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ongoing recognition of same-sex marriages. 17 2 Thus, the Naylor court
could recognize the marriage for the purpose of one incident, divorce,
because no ongoing marriage was recognized. The other court
rejected this idea.'73 In J.B. & H.B., the second Texas court ruled that
it was not possible to divorce the couple without "giv[ing] effect to"
the marriage. 7 4 A divorce would "establish the validity of that
marriage" for res judicata purposes. 75 Additionally, it would allow a
judge to divide property, even though "community property is a
paradigmatic legal benefit that is associated intimately and solely with
marriage. ' Moreover, the J.B. & H.B. court said, the "inherent
nature" of a divorce proceeding meant recognizing the underlying
marriage.' The J.B. & H.B. court therefore remanded to the trial
court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.' The
application of incidents analysis depends on the state's specific
marriage and divorce regime, but as the Texas cases show, incidents
analysis can lead to different answers even when courts are analyzing
the same statute.
2. Scholarship
Much of the academic work in this area has addressed exactly
how courts should apply the incidents theory in the context of
divorce. The problem can be seen in cases like those in New Jersey
and Wyoming, where the courts found that divorce was different but
struggled to articulate exactly why.'79 What scholars have tried to
illuminate is how to draw the line between divorce and other
incidents of marriage.
Some scholars have suggested that incidents analysis should be
applied through a balancing test."8° Under that theory, a judge should
balance the importance of the general policy against same-sex
marriage against the importance of the incident being litigated. 8' For
172. See Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 441; see also Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90,
8-10, 253 P.3d 153, 156-57 (Wyo. 2011) (suggesting that in Wyoming, the mini-DOMA
might apply only to the recognition of continuing marriages).




177. Id. at 666-67.
178. Id. at 681.
179. See Transcript of Decision, supra note 143, at 24; Christiansen v. Christiansen,
2011 WY 90, 11,253 P.3d 153, 156-57 (Wyo. 2011).
180. Cox, supra note 19, at 721-22; Johnson, supra note 19, at 247.
181. Cox, supra note 19, at 721-22; Johnson, supra note 19, at 247.
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example, the purpose of a statute granting survivor's or social security
benefits to the spouse of a deceased person is to provide for the most
likely dependent; if the state's interest in providing for the dependent
outweighs the policy against same-sex marriage, the marriage .should
be valid as to that incident."8 2 Andrew Koppelman has suggested
another test: if the same-sex couple could have replicated the right by
contract (e.g., inheritance rights for a spouse could have been
replicated in a will), the marriage should be valid as to that incident,
since there is no reason to punish the couple for having taken the
"shortcut" of contracting for the benefit via a marriage ceremonyY"
The balancing test has some intuitive appeal, but it is difficult to
apply, since it is impossible to precisely quantify a state's interest in
its various policies. Moreover, the balancing test might not produce
positive results for same-sex couples. Dozens of states have both
statutory and constitutional prohibitions banning recognition of
same-sex relationships. These provisions suggest that a state's interest
in non-recognition is often very strong and may outweigh its interests
in other policies.1 14 Koppelman's theory is easier to apply, but also sits
somewhat uneasily with some states' mini-DOMAs. In states with
strong policies against recognition of same-sex marriage, there is
arguably a reason to force couples to explicitly contract for marriage-
like benefits, rather than allowing a marriage ceremony to stand in for
182. Cox, supra note 19, at 722 (citing David E. Engdahl, Proposal for a Benign
Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOWA L. REV. 56, 105-09
(1970)); see also Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 421-22 (Sup. Ct. 2003),
rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 2005) (allowing surviving partner with an out-of-state
civil union to claim wrongful death benefits, although New York did not recognize civil
unions at the time).
183. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2145.
184. Danielle Johnson, a proponent of the balancing test, suggests that even in states
with mini-DOMAs, "it is likely that a state's policies and concerns will favor entertaining a
divorce petition among the state's domiciliaries." Johnson, supra note 19, at 247. She
argues that states have strong interests in protecting their citizens and furthering their
welfare, and that the state interests include dignifying a relationship that has ended with
formal closure and dividing property fairly. See id. ("(T]he courts should be more
concerned with providing assistance to its citizens than with politics."). That analysis is
complicated, though, in states with strong mini-DOMAs and no protections for gay
unions. Although domestic partnerships, civil unions, and same-sex marriage protect
citizens and further their welfare by dignifying relationships and protecting property,
many states have chosen not to enact such protections for same-sex couples-indeed,
many states have passed constitutional amendments prohibiting such protections. See
Koppelman, supra note 16, at 2165 (identifying statutes and constitutional provisions that
prohibit protections for same-sex couples). It is not clear why such states would have a
state interest in dignifying and protecting same-sex relationships by allowing same-sex
divorce.
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a contract.'85 Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether divorce is
something that can be contracted for. Some couples in the divorce
cases discussed above sought a divorce for psychic relief after they
had finished all issues of property and custody division. 86 Psychic
relief, and freedom to remarry, cannot be arranged by contract.1
87
The problems with these general theories suggest that it makes
most sense to apply incidents analysis with respect to a specific set of
state laws, rather than formulating a general test that applies in every
state. As the Hammond case from New Jersey shows, it is relatively
straightforward to apply incidents analysis when there is no state
mini-DOMA. i8  And as the Christansen case from Wyoming
illustrates, it can sometimes make sense to recognize a same-sex
marriage for the purpose of divorce even when the state has a mini-
185. Professor Koppelman argues that the conservative opposition to gay marriage
relates primarily to the normative, moral aspects of granting the marriage, not to the
"administrative" aspects, such as allowing gay couples to inherit and file joint tax returns.
See Koppelman, supra note 19, at 215-18. Most benefits that can be contracted for are
administrative, not normative; therefore, Koppelman argues, many conservative
opponents of same-sex marriage might agree that such administrative benefits should be
universally provided. Id. That argument makes most sense in states that allow civil unions
or domestic partnerships, but not same-sex marriages. Legislators or voters in those states
have granted administrative rights but have withheld the normative benefit of labeling the
relationship a "marriage." See Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identijdng Stigma in the
"Civil Union"/'Marriage" Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1493 (2009) ("But the Civil
Union Act deliberately withholds the unique name 'marriage,' which confers favored
identity, normal status, and easily recognized kinship forms. This withholding could be
understood as an insult from the legislature, albeit a discreet one."). But in states that
explicitly ban civil unions or domestic partnerships--or even contractual arrangements
between same-sex couples-the argument that courts should grant administrative benefits
to same-sex couples makes less sense. In states with expansive mini-DOMAs, the desire
seems to be to ban any acknowledgment of same-sex unions for any reason, normative or
administrative. See Koppelman, supra note 19, at 217 (discussing a Virginia Law that
renders " 'void and unenforceable' any 'civil union, partnership contract or other
arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction to
bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage'" (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3
(2008))). The position of the intervenors in same-sex divorce cases suggests that the
symbolic value of recognizing a marriage for any reason, even a limited incident for
"administrative" purposes, is perceived as powerful. See, e.g., Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court
Woodbury Cnty., 698 N.W.2d 858, 862 (Iowa 2005) (noting that state representatives, state
senators, a pastor, and a church attempted to intervene in a same-sex divorce case).
186. For instance, the Indiana and New Jersey cases involved no property division. See
Order on Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 123, at 2; Transcript ofDecision,
supra note 143, at 6-7.
187. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) ("Even where all substantive
requirements are concededly met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults
may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that
go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without
invoking the State's judicial machinery.").
188. Transcript of Decision, supra note 143, at 18, 21.
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DOMA.18 9 It is reasonable to interpret some narrowly worded mini-
DOMAs to bar recognition of same-sex marriages only on an ongoing
basis; indeed, ending a same-sex relationship may logically further the
state's interest in eliminating same-sex unions within the state.
Alternatively, as in the Rhode Island Chambers case, there may be
specific evidence that the legislature intended to make the forum for
divorce broader than the forum for marriage.1 90 In those states and
other states with relatively limited mini-DOMAs, judges can and
should apply incidents analysis to adjudicate divorce petitions.
3. Constitutional Avoidance
In states with much broader mini-DOMAs, however, the
application of incidents analysis is trickier. For instance,
Pennsylvania's mini-DOMA provides that "[a] marriage between
persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or
foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in
this Commonwealth."19' The voidness provision is self-executing-
that is, a same-sex marriage between Pennsylvania residents is
immediately void-and the provision itself rejects the application of
the lex loci celebrationis rule.192 Thus, it would seem that, in
Pennsylvania, there is never any ongoing same-sex marriage for a
judge to recognize. Unlike in Wyoming, there is no need to
harmonize statutes; the mini-DOMA itself provides that it takes
precedence over the traditional rule.
Although it is conceptually easiest to apply incidents analysis in
states with limited mini-DOMAs, there is an argument that even
judges in states with expansive mini-DOMAs should apply incidents
analysis. A standard canon of statutory construction says that judges
should interpret laws to avoid serious constitutional questions, and
there are serious questions about whether the mini-DOMAs are
constitutional.'93 The equal protection arguments that apply to
DOMA and same-sex marriage generally apply in this context as well.
Additionally, the mini-DOMAs may impose a "special disability" on
gay people and thus may be unconstitutional under the application of
189. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 4-13, 253 P.3d 153, 155-57 (Wyo.
2011).
190. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967-73 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting).
191. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2010).
192. See id.; see also ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 13 (describing the lex loci
celebrationis rule).
193. Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48,51(1984) (per curiam).
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the Equal Protection Clause in Romer v. Evans.9 4 And, as explained
in the next Section, there is a persuasive argument that forbidding
divorce violates the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. Finally, Professor Larry Kramer has argued that the
public policy exception embodied in the mini-DOMAs, though well
established, violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution. 195
To avoid ruling on the constitutional questions just described, a
judge would have to find that an expansive mini-DOMA did not
operate to deny the divorce. To do so, a judge would have to interpret
a mini-DOMA that bans recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages as allowing the recognition of such a marriage for the sole
purpose of divorce. That interpretation is not intuitive, but it is
defensible. Although there is not much caselaw on the issue, courts
have historically been willing to recognize a problematic marriage for
the purpose of a particular incident--even when there was clearly a
state public policy against recognition-so long as the couple was not
attempting to live as a married couple in the state.'96 For instance,
marriages barred by public policy were recognized in inheritance
cases.'97 If the state's interest is in prohibiting ongoing offensive
marriages, such limited recognition makes sense. It is certainly
possible to describe the state's interest more broadly, of course, but
194. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see Note, Litigating the Defense of
Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2684,
2699-700 (2004) (noting the possible unconstitutionality of mini-DOMAs based on the
special disability they may impose). In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated, under the
Equal Protection Clause, a Colorado constitutional amendment that specified that gay
people could not be designated a "protected class" and that homosexuality could not
"constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination."
517 U.S. at 624 (citing former COLO. CONST. art. I, § 30b, invalidated byRomer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)). In invalidating the law, the Court noted that "the amendment
imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the
State Constitution .... Id. at 631. Similarly, in states with constitutional mini-DOMAs,
gay people can obtain the right to marry only by "enlisting the citizenry" of various states
to amend the state constitutions. Id.; see also infra notes 215-21 (addressing constitutional
equal protection arguments in the same-sex divorce context).
195. Kramer, supra note 18, at 1991.
196. See Grossman, supra note 114, at 470.
197. See id. (citing In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1948); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948)).
2011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
far less intuitive statutory interpretations have been accepted in the
name of constitutional avoidance.1
98
The constitutional avoidance argument is available in states with
mini-DOMAs that bar recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages. It would not work, however, in the handful of states with
mini-DOMAs that expressly bar recognition of any incident of
marriage.'99 In those states, the judge could only grant a divorce by
confronting the constitutional questions head-on.
4. Summary
There is certainly a place for incidents analysis in same-sex
divorce litigation. It can provide a commonsense affirmation that one
forum's policy choices have historically not been thought to
undermine another forum's different choices, as in the New Jersey
Hammond case, as a way to reconcile seemingly conflicting statutes,
as in the Wyoming Christiansen case, or as a specific historical
argument, as in the Rhode Island Chambers case.200 It can even be
applied in states with expansive mini-DOMAs as a way of avoiding
difficult constitutional questions. Incidents analysis must, however,
include a sensitive review of state law. Given the subtle variations in
state laws-including laws governing same-sex unions, marriage laws,
and divorce laws-there is no one-size-fits-all answer to the divorce
problem in incidents analysis.
E. Voidness Cases
The final group of cases is not a new category, but a footnote to
the cases already discussed. In J.B. & H.B., one of the Texas cases,
the Texas Attorney General took an approach that may foreshadow a
new strategy in gay divorce litigation, arguing that the plaintiffs
remedy is to have his marriage declared void rather than being
198. See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, No. 10-0651, 2011 WL 4375001, at *14 (D.D.C.
Sept. 21, 2011) (discussing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2513-17 (2009)).
199. Grossman, supra note 114, at 483 (noting that eleven states bar recognition of any
incident arising out of same-sex marriage); see, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35.
200. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 971-72 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 8-10, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wyo.
2011); see also Transcript of Decision, supra note 143, at 12 ("I don't believe that allowing
Ms. Hammond to obtain a final judgment of divorce in New Jersey undermines the
legislative intent in the civil union statute ... particularly [given] ... the comity
relationship between New Jersey and Canada and the strong, the very strong marriage
recognition statute and process in New Jersey.").
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divorced.21 The Texas Family Code provides that "[e]ither party to a
marriage made void by this chapter may sue to have the marriage
declared void,' 20 2 and the statutory mini-DOMA states that "[a]
marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is contrary
to the public policy of this state and is void in this state.""2 3 In light of
these two statutes, the voidness provision seems to apply, so the
parties may end up with a marriage declared void.2° Judges in
Indiana and Pennsylvania divorce cases have also suggested that a
declaration of voidness, rather than a divorce, would be the
appropriate remedy.
25
There are at least two problems, however, with setting up a
shadow divorce system of voiding marriages to parallel the shadow
marriage system of civil unions.20 6 First, in many states, declarations of
voidness do not have all of the substantive benefits of divorce.
Divorce has two components: it provides a neutral adjudicator for
property division and custody allocation, and it frees couples from the
legal relationship and allows them to remarry. Voiding a marriage
may not provide either aspect of divorce. In many states, including
Indiana, a declaration of voidness does not allow a judge to divide
property, allocate custody, or take any other substantive action. 27 In
Texas, pre-marital agreements are not enforceable in voidness
proceedings, nor are standard community property divisions
available.2 8 Smaller benefits like name changes are available, and
judges have sometimes taken it upon themselves to divide property.
209
But in many or most states, voidness is clearly an inferior substitute
for divorce when it comes to pragmatic issues.
The second problem is that it is not clear whether judgments of
voidness will be given full faith and credit in other states; thus, a
voidness declaration may not fulfill the second component of divorce.
In the Texas proceedings, the state of Texas has cited no evidence
201. Brief of Appellee at 8-12, In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex.
App. 2010) (No. 05-09-01170-CV) ("A voidance proceeding is not an adequate substitute
for divorce.").
202. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.307 (West 2007).
203. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2007).
204. SeeBrief of Appellee, supra note 201, at 28-33.
205. See supra notes 125, 129 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 125, 130 and accompanying text.
207. E.g.,IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2007).
208. See Brief ofAppellee, supra note 201, at 29.
209. Id.
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showing that a Texas marriage declared void was ever accepted as
void elsewhere.2"0 As the plaintiff in one of the cases argued,
a suit to void a marriage simply "decrees," somewhat circularly
and tautologically, what Texas has already determined as a
matter of law-that a "marriage" the state considers void is, in
fact, void. The decree has no legal effect other than to express
the state of affairs that already existed before the voidance
proceeding. Such legal nullities are not given full faith and
credit. 1'
Additionally, voidness declarations are sufficiently rare that
having a marriage declared void might not provide sufficient security
for a gay person who wished to remarry. 12 A divorce judgment would
be easier to understand since it is so familiar.213
F. ConstitutionalArguments
Although state courts have shown little enthusiasm for
constitutional arguments in favor of same-sex divorce--only one case
has granted a same-sex couple a divorce on a constitutional theory,
and that case was quickly overturned-there are at least two
arguments that same-sex couples have a specific constitutional right
to divorce. 4 This Section will describe and evaluate those arguments.
The first constitutional argument is that denying same-sex
couples the right to divorce is an equal protection violation. This is in
line with the argument that denying same-sex couples the right to
210. Id. at 31-32 (noting that the State had produced evidence that annulments were
given full faith and credit elsewhere, but no evidence of voidness proceedings that had
been given full faith and credit elsewhere).
211. Id.
212. Seeid. at 28-33.
213. Perhaps because the idea of voiding a same-sex marriage or civil union rather than
divorcing the parties has only arisen in the last few years, it has received no academic
attention. Scholarship might be able to illuminate how voidness declarations have
functioned in the past, and whether voiding marriages could operate as a complete
substitute for divorce. At the moment, however, voidness proceedings are a complicated,
confusing replacement for routine divorce proceedings.
214. There appears to be only one case that granted a divorce based on an equal
protection theory. See Order on Intervenor's Plea to the Jurisdiction at 1, In re Marriage
of J.B. & H.B., No. DF-09-1074 (Dallas Cnty. Dist. Ct., Tex., Oct. 1, 2009), 2009 WL
3316580, at * 1; see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4-7, J.B. & H.B., No.
DF-09-1074 (Dallas Cnty. Dist. Ct., Tex. Dec. 7, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (explaining that denying same-sex couples access to divorce violates the
federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the First
Amendment freedom of association, and the right to travel). The decision was promptly
overturned by an appellate court. See J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 670-81.
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marry is an equal protection violation. This Section will not address
this argument at length because the argument is already well-known
in the context of marriage.215 In brief, proponents of the equal
protection theory argue that gay people constitute a protected class;
that laws discriminating against them are subject to either strict or
intermediate scrutiny; and that there is no compelling government
interest in the discriminatory laws, nor are they substantially related
to an important governmental objective.1 6 An alternative version of
the argument is that gay people are not a protected class, but that the
government lacks any rational basis for distinguishing between gay
people and gay couples, on the one hand, and heterosexual people
and couples, on the other.2"7
The equal protection argument is somewhat stronger in the
divorce context than in the marriage context.218 In the divorce
context, the same-sex couple is already married in some state; the
only question is whether the forum state has an interest in denying
the couple a divorce. There may not be even a rational interest in
denying the divorce, much less a compelling interest.219 In the
marriage context, some courts have found that the state has a rational
interest in favoring opposite-sex marriage over same-sex marriage for
reasons related to procreation: legislators are entitled to believe that
children do best with opposite-sex parents, and legislators are entitled
to promote opposite-sex marriage, since only opposite-sex couples
can procreate naturally.220 In the divorce context, however, that basis
for favoring opposite-sex marriage disappears. Granting a divorce to
a same-sex couple does not increase the likelihood that children will
be raised in a household headed by opposite-sex parents, or in any
way affect whether opposite-sex couples will choose to marry and
215. See, e.g., Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, Equal Protection, Due Process,
and Same-Sex Marriage. The Reformation Continues, 20 MIDWEST L.J. 23, 24-25, 46-48
(2006) (outlining the argument).
216. See id.; see also Mark P. Strasser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1022-30 (2011) (discussing how to
determine the appropriate classification and level of scrutiny for a given group).
217. See Schoen & Falchek, supra note 215, at 24-25, 46-48.
218. SeePetition for Review at 10-13, J.B. &H.B., No. 11-0024-CV (Sup. Ct. Tex. Feb.
17, 2011).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) ("[W]e will discuss
only these two [rational bases for the statute], both of which are derived from the
undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children."); J.B. &
H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 674 ("The persons singled out and favored by Texas's marriage laws,
namely opposite-sex couples, have such a distinguishing and relevant characteristic: the
natural ability to procreate.").
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raise children. 21 If there is no rational basis for denying a divorce to
married same-sex couples, a fortiori, there is no exceedingly
persuasive or compelling reason for doing so.
The second constitutional argument for divorce is a due process
argument, and it is less well known than the equal protection theory.
Colleen McNichols Ramais has developed this argument based on the
Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Boddie v. Connecticut,22 a case
where a class of indigent plaintiffs challenged mandatory fees for
opposite-sex divorce proceedings. 223 Instead of narrowing the issue to
indigents' right of access to courts, the Supreme Court focused on the
"special nature of the divorce action.22 4 Unlike many other kinds of
disputes, divorce actions can only be resolved via a court judgment;
even if property can be divided via contract, individuals cannot
contract for their freedom to remarry.225 Without access to a court,
then, an individual would be "locked into a marriage," an outcome
that the Boddie Court found violated the Due Process Clause.2 6
The due process argument may apply to same-sex couples as
well. Of course, they are not "locked in" to the marriage in the sense
that they can establish domicile in a state that will grant them a
divorce, but having to relocate is surely more onerous a burden than
the approximately $60 filing fee that was invalidated in Boddie.27
However, one problem with the due process theory is that it is subject
to the same sort of slipperiness that attends attempts to extend
Loving v. Virginia,2 ' a case that described marriage as a
"fundamental" right, to same-sex couples. 29  Marriage is a
fundamental right, but it is doubtful that the 1967 Loving Court
thought it was describing same-sex marriage as a fundamental right.
Similarly, access to divorce is a fundamental right, but the implicit
notion in Boddie might be that access to divorce for heterosexual
couples is a fundamental right. However, it is easier to translate
Boddiethan Lovinginto the same-sex context. The concern in Boddie
was that people would be "locked into a marriage"; the people who
221. SeePetition for Review, supra note 218, at 10-13.
222. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
223. Id. at 372-73; see also Ramais, supra note 2, at 1033-34 (discussing Boddie).
224. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381 n.8.
225. Id. at 376.
226. Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
228. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
229. Id. at 12.
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need access to courts, therefore, are those who are married, whether
to a person of the same sex or the opposite sex.
We do not know how a court faced with a Boddie argument
would react because no plaintiff has yet invoked Boddie. A state
court faced with a Boddie argument might, however, respond that if
the state refuses to recognize the same-sex marriage, there is no need
to grant access to state courts to dissolve the relationship. Consider,
for instance, the Rhode Island majority in Chambers. It referred to
the parties' union as a "purported" marriage, even though (as the
dissent protested) there was undoubtedly a valid marriage in
Massachusetts.23 Even if the plaintiff had made a Boddie argument,
the Rhode Island court could have published a virtually identical
opinion denying a divorce from the "purported" marriage. This is not
to say that the court would have been right to do so. Given Boddie,
and given that the state of present domicile is in the best and perhaps
only position to grant the divorce, perhaps the state ought to set aside
its other interests and grant a same-sex couple's request for a divorce.
Boddie thus provides a compelling reason for judges in every state to
grant divorces to same-sex couples who seek them. But given that not
every judge will be persuaded by the Boddie argument, it is not a
complete solution to the same-sex divorce question. It is therefore
still important to explore other judicial and legislative solutions.
In many states, it is possible-indeed, logical-for a judge to take
jurisdiction over a divorce petition and grant it in its entirety. In those
states, a judge weighing all the provisions of the family code, the
legislative intent behind the code, and prior state caselaw could
reasonably decide that he may or must grant a divorce. But in other
states, a constitutional argument may be the only way a judge can
grant a divorce petition.
Because there is no obvious right answer for the judges who will
decide these cases-and because couples moving to new states often
have no idea whether they will be able to divorce-Part III will turn
to whether legislatures have the power to weigh in on the same-sex
divorce problem.
230. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2007); id. at 968 (Suttell, J.,
dissenting).
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III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE SAME-SEX DIVORCE
PROBLEM
The same-sex divorce problem has been characterized so far as a
problem for judges to solve, but as we have seen, judges across and
even within state lines still respond very differently when faced with
divorce petitions. State supreme courts could bring order to the field
eventually, but that will be a slow process, and a same-sex couple that
does not know where they will eventually make their home may still
be hesitant to marry if divorce is barred in many states. This Part will
therefore explore whether legislative solutions could provide more
certainty for such couples.
Fundamentally, there are two categories of legislative solutions
to the same-sex divorce problem: those enacted in states with gay
marriage, and those enacted in states without gay marriage."'
A. Return-to-Divorce Clauses
The simplest solution to the same-sex divorce problem is for
states that already permit gay marriage-and thus have expressed a
preference for equality for gay couples-to enact statutes providing
that any same-sex couple married in the state may return to the state
to divorce. Such statutes could be part of the original same-sex
marriage legislation or could be enacted as a standalone act. This
solution is very appealing because of the certainty it would create for
gay couples. However, it is an open question whether states can draft
such return-to-divorce clauses. This Section addresses that question,
along with the pragmatic issues involved in enacting return-to-divorce
clauses.
The legal uncertainty springs from the Supreme Court's 1945
opinion in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11).23 In that case,
the Supreme Court considered whether North Carolina had to
231. There is also, of course, another legislative solution: A state can legalize same-sex
marriage. Legalizing same-sex marriage is the most straightforward way to solve the same-
sex divorce problem, but it obviously evokes many other political and social issues.
232. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The case originally went to the Supreme Court on the
question whether North Carolina had to give full faith and credit to Nevada's divorce
judgment if only one member of each couple was properly domiciled in Nevada. Williams
v. North Carolina ( Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942). The Williams I Court found that
North Carolina did have to give full faith and credit to the divorce in those circumstances.
Id. But the Court reserved the question whether North Carolina could refuse to give full
faith and credit to the divorce if North Carolina courts found, contrary to the findings of
the Nevada court, that the divorce petitioners were not actually domiciled in Nevada. Id.
at 302. After further proceedings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court addressed that
question in WilliamsII, 325 U.S. at 227.
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recognize a divorce granted in Nevada. A man and a woman, seeking
to divorce their respective spouses and marry each other instead, had
traveled to Nevada for six weeks. 33 Six weeks was exactly the amount
of time needed to establish domicile in Nevada for divorce. 34 After
six weeks, they both divorced their spouses, married each other, and
returned to North Carolina. 3 ' North Carolina prosecuted them for
bigamy, and the case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court.
The Court concluded that divorce judgments are subject to full faith
and credit, but noted that "[u]nder our system of law, judicial power
to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on
domicil[e]," that is, intent to remain indefinitely in the state (usually
proved by a period of residence).236 A court faced with an out-of-state
divorce is allowed to assure itself that the courts of the state that
granted the divorce had jurisdiction properly based on domicile. 37 If
so, it must grant full faith and credit to the divorce decree, but if not,
the state may refuse to recognize the divorce.2 38 Most scholars have
assumed that Williams II sets a constitutional floor--domicile-for
the exercise of divorce jurisdiction, or have at least assumed that
divorce without domicile "poses far too many jurisdictional
complications to be an adequate remedy.
239
The idea that Williams HI set a constitutional minimum for
jurisdiction over divorce cases, however-as opposed to merely
affirming that domicile is a constitutionally sufficient condition for
jurisdiction-is questionable. First, the Court was noticeably vague
about the basis for its holding. It did say that "[t]he framers of the
Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and
since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-
speaking world has questioned it." 4 ° But the Court did not quite say
that those framers therefore made domicile a constitutional
requirement, the Court might have merely been reiterating the
historical common law requirement, or even just noting that Nevada
233. Id. at 241 (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 289-90
(recounting the circumstances surrounding petitioners' divorces in Nevada).
234. Williams 17, 325 U.S. at 235 n.8; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (2010)
(codifying the amount of time needed to establish domicile in Nevada for divorce).
235. Williams-1, 317 U.S. at 289-90.
236. Williams 1, 325 U.S. at 229.
237. See id, ("A judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in every other
State, but only if the court of the first State had power to pass on the merits-had
jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment.").
238. Id.
239. See Kay, supra note 19, at 82, 84, 89-90; Ramais, supra note 2, at 1037-38.
240. Williams 1, 325 U.S. at 229.
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law specified that domicile was a prerequisite for jurisdiction.2"' The
Court actually seemed to be driven by policy concerns: it noted that
divorce affects society generally, and that a state should not be
allowed to impose its divorce policy on other states without a
sufficient stake in the matter. 42 Two dissenting justices picked up on
the Court's vagueness as to the source of the domicile requirement,
accusing the Court of "seem[ing]" to create a constitutional
requirement out of whole cloth and asserting that divorce law was
sounder without the concept of domicile.243 In the years following
Williams II, law review articles flew on both sides of the issue. 44 As
Professor Edward S. Stimson pointed out, domicile was not a
requirement for marriage, yet it certainly ought to be under the
Williams Iltheory.
245
The Williams IlCourt was wrong in asserting that the framers of
the Constitution were familiar with domicile as a prerequisite for
divorce. In England, divorce was solely a matter for ecclesiastical
courts until 1858, and those courts had "jurisdiction over Christians"
irrespective of domicile. 46 England did not impose a domicile
requirement until 1895, and it was later replaced with a residency
requirement.247 In the United States, colonial legislatures handled
divorces until around the time of the ratification of the
Constitution.24 While legislators presumably handled petitions from
residents of their states, many of whom would also have been
domiciliaries, there was no domicile requirement.249 In the late
241. See id.
242. Id. at 231-33.
243. Id. at 271 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 244 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhe Court has travelled in a domiciliary wilderness, only to come out with no settled
constitutional policy where one is needed most.").
244. See, e.g., Constitutional Law-Due Process-Statute Giving Court Jurisdiction for
Divorce Without Proof ofDomicile, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 206,208 (1954); Constitutionality
ofAssertion of Divorce Jurisdiction by Non-Domiciliary Forum, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 415,
416 (1954); Peter L. Costas, Divorce and Domicile: "here Confusion Reigns Supreme, 5
SYRACUSE L. REV. 219, 221 (1954); Alan H. Levine, Divorce Jurisdiction-Marriage
Performed Within State Held Sufficient to Confer Jurisdiction on New York Courts, 4 BUFF.
L. REV. 252, 252 (1955); Marriage Within the State As a Basis of Divorce Jurisdiction, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1954); W.C.S., Domestic Relations: Statutory Presumption of
Domicile, 19ALB.L.REV. 103,107 (1955).
245. Edward S. Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the
Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A. J. 222, 295 (1956).
246. Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile. Time to Sever the Knot 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1997).
247. Id. at 9-11.
248. Id. at 12.
249. Seeid. at 12-13.
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eighteenth century, state courts began to share jurisdiction over
divorces with state legislatures, and by " 'the mid-nineteenth century
migratory divorce was being discouraged in many states by the
imposition of minimum residency requirements.' "250
The Williams JlCourt was also wrong in asserting that no "court
in the English-speaking world has questioned" the domicile
requirement.2 1' Eighty-three years before Williams II, New York,
which at that time had only fault-based divorce, enacted a return-to-
divorce provision stating that couples married in the state could be
divorced there:
In any of the following cases, a husband or a wife may maintain
an action against the other party to the marriage to procure a
judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage by
reason of the defendant's adultery:
2. Where the parties were married within the state. 2
The New York courts were untroubled by Williams II and
reaffirmed the return-to-divorce provision's validity shortly after that
case. In David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss,253 the New York Supreme Court
called the Supreme Court's analysis in Williams II "too loose," and
pointed to years of its own unchallenged caselaw, wondering tartly
whether "in making the statement [that no English-speaking court
had ever questioned the domicile requirement], Mr. Justice
Frankfurter was merely unaware of Gould v. Gould [an earlier New
York case], or whether he intended to say that the New York Court
of Appeals is not an English-speaking court. 254 Another New York
court, writing twenty years after Williams II, agreed that "domicile is
not intrinsically an indispensable prerequisite to jurisdiction. ' 25  The
return-to-divorce provision was repealed as part of a comprehensive
divorce reform law in 1966, but not because it was ever found
unconstitutional.
25 6
250. Id. at 12-14 & n.64 (quoting RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A
HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 445 (1988)).
251. Williams II, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
252. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(2) (Consol. 1964) (repealed 1966); see also Brawer v.
Pinkins, 626 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (noting that the statute was valid from 1862
to 1966, when it was repealed as part of a comprehensive divorce reform law).
253. 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
254. Id. at 654.
255. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. 1965).
256. Brawer, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
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New York is not the only jurisdiction to dispense with the
domicile requirement. Guam, a territory whose divorce judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit, requires only a seven-day stay plus
consent of both spouses in order to grant an uncontested divorce. 57
Yet there appear to be no instances of the validity of a Guam divorce
being challenged on this ground. Additionally, some states have long
allowed members of the military to seek a divorce in states where
they are not domiciled. 58
The Supreme Court took up the question of domicile and divorce
again in 1975.259 A plaintiff challenged Iowa's domicile requirement,
claiming that it was unconstitutional because it violated the right to
travel and imperiled Boddie's right of access to divorce.2 6' The Court
rejected both arguments. In doing so, however, the Court did not
say--or even suggest-that the domicile requirement could not be
unconstitutional because it was mandated by the Constitution. The
Court merely held that "[w]ith consequences of such moment riding
on a divorce decree issued by its courts, Iowa may insist that one
seeking to instigate such a proceeding have the modicum of
attachment to the State required here. ' 261
Thus, the Supreme Court has never clearly held that domicile is a
requirement for divorce, and some jurisdictions have proceeded on
the theory that it is not. Moreover, as several scholars have pointed
out, the idea that domicile is a constitutional prerequisite for divorce
makes no sense.262 The law of divorce jurisdiction "inhabits a looking-
glass world in which the usual conflicts principles are distorted
beyond recognition. Jurisdiction over the defendant seems to be
neither necessary nor sufficient to empower a court to hear a divorce
257. 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 8318 (2011) ("If both parties consent in writing to a
divorce or dissolution of their marriage, a divorce or dissolution may be granted if one of
the parties has resided in Guam for at least seven (7) days immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint.").
258. Wasserman, supra note 246, at 20-21; see also, e.g., James Doores, Statute
Eliminating Requirement of Domicile for Servicemen's Divorces Held Valid Under State
and Federal Constitutions-Wood v. Wood, 320 S. W2d 807, 37 TEX. L. REV. 626, 626 &
n.l (1959) (describing a case involving a member of the military who sought divorce
outside his domicile).
259. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
260. Id. at 405.
261. Id.at407.
262. See Wasserman, supra note 246, at 27-32; see also Costas, supra note 244, at 219
(commenting on the confusion in divorce law with respect to domicile); Constitutional
Law, supra note 244, at 207-09 (same); Constitutionality of Assertion, supra note 244, at
415 (same); Marriage Within the State, supra note 244, at 1166 (same).
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case." 263 Jurisdiction is not necessary because the defending spouse
can be haled into court in the plaintiff spouse's state of domicile. 4
And it is not sufficient because a state court could have judicial
jurisdiction over both parties but be unable to adjudicate a divorce if
neither party is a domiciliary of the state. 65
There is no historical basis for believing that domicile is a
constitutional prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction.266 The question,
then, is whether there is any constitutional reason to require domicile
under the Supreme Court's other judicial jurisdiction jurisprudence.
Under International Shoe Co. v. Washington,267 the seminal personal
jurisdiction case decided the same year as Williams I, the exercise of
jurisdiction is proper when the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the state such that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 2 68 This
standard focuses on whether the forum is reasonably convenient for
the defendant, not on whether the state has a sovereign interest in
adjudicating the dispute. In 1980, the Court added a new dimension
to the personal jurisdiction test in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson 69 :
The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process
Clause, in its role as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation,
have been substantially relaxed over the years . ..
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state
lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we,
and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution.... The sovereignty of each State
... implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original
scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 °
If the Due Process Clause limits a state's ability to exercise
jurisdiction in a case that may interfere with another state's sovereign
interests, that could theoretically be a reason to treat jurisdiction in
divorce cases differently. State sovereignty, after all, was the implicit
263. David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict ofLaws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26, 26 (1966).
264. Wasserman, supra note 246, at 1-2.
265. Id. at 2.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 245-47.
267. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
268. Id. at 316 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
270. Id. at 292-93.
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concern of the Williams II Court: as the Court explained, "[t]he
problem is to reconcile the reciprocal respect to be accorded by the
members of the Union to their adjudications with due regard for
another most important aspect of our federalism whereby 'the
domestic relations of husband and wife ... were matters reserved to
the States' .... 271
However, the evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
jurisprudence, along with the evolution of divorce law, makes this
argument questionable. Only two years after World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court retreated from the statement that state
sovereignty concerns are an independent component of the Due
Process Clause:
[Personal jurisdiction] represents a restriction on judicial power
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty.... The restriction on state sovereign power described
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.... must be seen as ultimately
a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns.2
Thus, the key component of the judicial jurisdiction inquiry
remains whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" from the parties'
perspective. As the same-sex divorce cases and other cases273 make
crystal clear, however, the domicile requirement undermines, rather
than protects, the parties' interests. The International Shoe standard
already provides that the parties must have some contact with a state
(or consent to litigating there) before a state court can exercise
jurisdiction. The domicile requirement adds nothing, but it makes
divorce totally unavailable for some couples even as it forces other
defendants to litigate in states that could not exercise jurisdiction over
them in non-divorce cases.274
271. Williams I, 325 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1945).
272. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 &
n.10 (1982).
273. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 246, at 3-4, 33-35. In one case, for instance, a
husband and wife had spent all twenty-five years of their marriage in New York. When a
New York court denied their divorce, the wife flew to Alaska, declared that " 'she felt sure
this was the place she wanted to be,' " and filed for divorce. Id. at 3 (quoting Perito v.
Perito, 756 P.2d 895, 896 (Alaska 1988)). The court granted the divorce over the husband's
protest. Id.
274. See supra text accompanying note 260.
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Moreover, the state sovereign interest in regulating divorce has
arguably diminished since 1945. At that time, states had markedly
different divorce laws.275 Now, all fifty states have adopted some
version of no-fault divorce. 276 Because there is relatively little
variation between state laws, the Williams II concern for protecting
each state's choices is less important. Even in the arena of same-sex
divorce, states do not vary in what is required for a divorce; they vary
only in whether to recognize the underlying marriage. Moreover, if
gay couples are not marrying because they fear they will not be able
to divorce in other states, a state's sovereign interest in allowing its
residents to marry may be affected.
In short, there is no longer any reason for allowing an archaic set
of rules to govern jurisdiction over divorce but no other category of
cases. The International Shoe test, which suffices in nearly every other
area of law, should suffice here as well.277 Under that test, it would be
relatively straightforward for a state to enact a return-to-divorce law.
The parties could be given the option of consenting to the state's
jurisdiction in any future divorce at the time they receive a marriage
license; or, alternatively, they could consent to the state's jurisdiction
if no alternative divorce forum existed. Even without consent, parties
might well be subject to specific divorce jurisdiction under the
275. See Wasserman, supra note 246, at 25.
276. Stephanie Coontz, Divorce, No-Fault Sole, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A29; see
also Paterson Signs No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at A14 (reporting
on the signing of a law that created no-fault divorce in New York, the last state to adopt
such a law).
277. Although jurisdiction over divorce is usually characterized as a problem of judicial
jurisdiction, the problem also has an aspect of legislative jurisdiction: may states apply
their divorce law to non-residents? Under the test articulated in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), it seems clear that they can. A state court may apply its own
law to a dispute when the parties have "a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts [with the state], creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 312-13. The Supreme Court has paid more
attention to the "arbitrary or unfair" portion of the test than the "state interest" portion;
as one commentator has observed, the state interest "element of the test probably retains
no independent constitutional significance. It is hard to think of a contact that would not
create a constitutionally adequate interest." ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 131-32. The
parties have contact with the state when they marry there and, if they know they may be
subject to the state's divorce law in the future, the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
unfair.
In theory, it might be possible to solve the same-sex divorce problem entirely
through choice-of-law rules: for instance, Texas could apply Massachusetts's divorce law
to divorce two Texas domiciliaries who were married in Massachusetts. In practice,
however, courts have always applied their own law to divorce cases; to apply normal
choice-of-law rules to such family law cases would be unprecedented. Wasserman, supra
note 246, at 2.
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purposeful availment test if they chose to marry in the state, although
there is obviously no current caselaw establishing that proposition.278
Perhaps reflecting these ideas, California already has such a
return-to-dissolve clause in its domestic partnership act:
The superior courts shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings
relating to the dissolution of domestic partnerships, nullity of
domestic partnerships, and legal separation of partners in a
domestic partnership. The dissolution of a domestic
partnership, nullity of a domestic partnership, and legal
separation of partners in a domestic partnership shall follow the
same procedures, and the partners shall possess the same rights,
protections, and benefits, and be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties, as apply to the
dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, and legal
separation of spouses in a marriage, respectively, except as
provided in subdivision (a), and except that, in accordance with
the consent acknowledged by domestic partners in the
Declaration of Domestic Partnership form, proceedings for
dissolution, nullity, or legal separation of a domestic partnership
registered in this state may be filed in the superior courts of this
state even if neither domestic partner is a resident of, or
maintains a domicile in, the state at the time the proceedings are
filed.27 9
Although historical caselaw has naturally focused on marriage,
there is no theoretical basis for distinguishing between dissolving a
marriage and dissolving a domestic partnership, particularly since
California law states that domestic partners "have the same rights,
protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether they
derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules,
government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources
of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses."28 Yet
California's provision has not been challenged on constitutional or
other grounds.
In sum, a quick reading of Williams If, along with the fact that
states nearly always have domicile requirements for divorce, might
suggest that a return-to-divorce clause would be invalid. But that
argument does not take into account the persistence of state divorce
278. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09
(1987) (discussing the purposeful availment test).
279. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299(d) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
280. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).
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laws dispensing with the domicile prerequisite; the consistent
academic countercurrent against the Williams II holding; the
Supreme Court's later equivocal pronouncements; and the evolution
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the constitutional basis for
judicial jurisdiction.2 1
If it were certain that Williams Hwould not bar return-to-divorce
clauses, they would clearly be the best answer to the gay divorce
problem. Even with the uncertainty, such clauses are still the best
answer.
B. Divorce Recognition Legislation
In states that have not legalized gay marriage, legislators who are
convinced that divorce is a benefit that ought to be extended to
resident gay couples are in a good position to enact legislation. To
this end, two types of laws would be helpful. First, unless a broad
constitutional mini-DOMA constrained the legislature, it could enact
a law providing that individuals domiciled in the state could seek a
same-sex divorce in the state courts, so long as the couple had been
validly married in another state. In states with a statutory (but not
constitutional) mini-DOMA banning recognition of same-sex
marriages, the legislature is in a better position to make divorce
available to same-sex couples than a court. A judge might feel
constrained to interpret a statutory mini-DOMA as precluding
divorce; a legislature could simply clarify that the mini-DOMA did
not prohibit recognition of an out-of-state same-sex marriage for the
limited purpose of granting a divorce. In a state with no mini-DOMA
at all, of course, there is no issue whatsoever with the legislature
281. Legislators might not want to enact a return-to-divorce clause if they fear that
such a clause would simply add to the already pervasive uncertainty in the same-sex
divorce arena. Despite the uncertainty, such provisions would be worthwhile. The return-
to-divorce provisions in existence have yet to be challenged, in part because there is little
incentive for anyone to challenge them. To use Texas as an example, if the same-sex
couples from Texas could have returned to Massachusetts to obtain a divorce, there would
be a much weaker argument that Texas was being forced to recognize an underlying same-
sex marriage. Indeed, the recognition question would only arise if a couple wanted Texas
courts to enforce some aspect of the Massachusetts divorce.
One other concern could be that any state with such legislation would be turned
into a gay divorce mill. But limiting the option to couples who marry in the state would cut
down the number of migrant divorces. Simplified divorce proceedings are another way to
keep costs down; California domestic partnerships, for instance, may be dissolved via a
mail-in form when the dissolution is uncontested and a number of other conditions are
met. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE: Bus. PROG. Divis., TERMINATING A CALIFORNIA
REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP (2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov/dpregistry/forms/sf-
dp2.pdf.
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enacting a law allowing same-sex couples to divorce. As long as one
member of the couple was validly domiciled in the state, there would
be no Williams IIproblem.
In Rhode Island, the legislature has already considered passing
such a bill.282 The sponsors of the bill proposed to add the following
language to Rhode Island's divorce code:
Regardless of whether the parties would have been eligible to
marry in Rhode Island, the parties to any marriage, or other
domestic relationship granting substantially similar rights and
obligations of marriage, recognized in any state of the United
States, possession of the United States, or in any foreign
country, may petition for a divorce proceeding in this state so
long as the parties meet [other jurisdictional requirements].283
The Attorney General and various legal organizations supported the
bill.284 The bill was ultimately held over for further study, but the fact
that there is some political will to make the change, and that it
appears to be relatively simple to write the necessary statutory
language, is encouraging to those who support legislative solutions.285
The second type of legislation that would be helpful concerns the
second gay divorce problem, which this Article has otherwise not
addressed-the case where a couple obtains a valid same-sex divorce
in a state that will grant it, but then moves to another state that
refuses to recognize the divorce. One might expect that a divorce
judgment would always be recognized on full faith and credit
grounds, but DOMA says that no state "shall be required to give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage. ' 286 Thus, states can apparently disregard
divorce proceedings from other states, and some mini-DOMAs direct
state actors to do just that.287 A state that wanted to recognize such
divorces, however, could do so by passing simple clarifying legislation.
282. Randal Edgar, RI Legislative Committee Hears Testimony on Same-Sex Divorce
Bill, PROVIDENCE J., May 5, 2010, available athttp://web.archive.org/web/20100508121458
/http://www.projo.com/news/politics/content/SAMESEX_DIVORCE05-05-10
_IHIBQO5_v37.42920cl.html.
283. H.B. 7990, 2010 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 1 (R.I. 2010) (not enacted).
284. Edgar, supra note 282.
285. Id. (noting the bill was held over).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2010).
287. GA. CONST. art I, § IV; ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-208 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 402.045 (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (LexisNexis 2008); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2006).
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Such legislation would be useful to divorced gay individuals
considering moving to a new state who want to know that a previous
divorce would remain enforceable.
CONCLUSION
Discriminatory access to divorce hurts gay people. Couples can
be left without any neutral party to divide property or adjudicate
custody of their children; they can find themselves unable to escape a
legal relationship that they want to move beyond; a parade of
intervenors can appear in their private divorce case; or they can end
up with a rare and confusing "void" marriage. Same-sex couples
wishing to marry already have to navigate a slew of confusing state
and federal laws, and the divorce problem imposes the additional
burden of having to decide whether the benefits of legal marriage are
worth the risk that they may not be able to divorce. The lack of access
to divorce is unique to same-sex couples, and because the problem is
poorly publicized, all of this takes place in a haze of bad information
and little precedent.
So far, the problem has played out mostly in courtrooms.
Initially, several judges reacted based on the simple assumption that it
couldn't be right to keep people in unions they wished to end.288 The
law has since developed in a more rigid direction, as judges struggle
to interpret divorce statutes and, specifically, how to interpret the
word "marriage" as used in a divorce statute.289 Some judges have
jumped into the task of statutory interpretation without examining
the special development of family law and considering whether the
lex loci celebrationis principle or incidents analysis is the right way to
dissect a divorce statute. 290 Those principles deserve to be taken more
seriously in same-sex divorce cases, and judges in more states should
grant same-sex divorce petitions based on those principles.
Because of the variety of state laws at play, however, the
development of law in this area is almost guaranteed to be haphazard.
In existing caselaw, judges in the same states have reached contrary
results, and judges in different states have reached conflicting results
on wildly different theories. This uncertainty will diminish somewhat
when state supreme courts begin to issue definitive guidance, but it
will not disappear in the near term. Couples who do not know where
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. See supra Part II.A-D.
290. See supra Part II.B (discussing originalism cases); Part II.C (discussing lex loci
celebrationis cases); Part II.D. 1 (discussing incidents analysis cases).
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the future will take them may still be reluctant to marry when some
states allow same-sex divorce and others forbid it.
The best way to end that uncertainty is for states that allow gay
marriage to guarantee that their courts will be available as a divorce
forum, even if the couple has moved elsewhere. As Part III argued,
Williams II should not bar that result. The basis for the Williams II
holding was unclear, and the historical evidence is that return-to-
divorce clauses survived it unchallenged.291
Given the current chaos, the best way to solve the same-sex
divorce problem is to make all options available to gay couples. States
that allow gay marriage or civil unions should consider following the
lead of Vermont and warning prospective couples that they may not
be able to dissolve their union if they leave the state.292 States that
allow gay marriage should also consider retaining or adding civil
unions with return-to-divorce clauses as an additional option, since
some mobile couples may decide that the benefits of a union formally
called a "marriage" are not worth the greater risk of being unable to
end the legal relationship.293 Judges faced with divorce petitions
should employ incidents analysis and consider the lex loci
celebrationis principle when permissible under state laws; all judges
should consider whether Boddie and other constitutional arguments
mean that every state must make divorce available to same-sex
couples. Legislators should try to clarify or expand state divorce
forums. All of these tactics combined can end the Kafkaesque divorce
maze and make a painful experience a little less so.
291. See supra Part III.A.
292. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160(f) (repealed 2009).
293. Some states have phased out civil unions upon legalizing gay marriage. For
instance, Washington, D.C. began phasing out its civil unions on January 1, 2011 as a result
of its same-sex marriage law. Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment
Act of 2009, 57 D.C. Reg. 27 (Jan. 1, 2010). As explained above, there is no theoretical
reason that a return-to-divorce clause in the civil union context should be treated
differently than a return-to-divorce clause in the marriage context, but because the
historical caselaw focuses on marriage, judges might decide that civil unions create
different legal issues. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. Alternatively, a judge
may be constrained by a mini-DOMA to treat civil unions and same-sex marriages
differently. See, e.g., supra note 280.
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